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
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THE BOSS

AN ESSAY UPON THE ART OF GOVERNING
AMERICAN CITIES

5-28-33

BY

HENRY CHAMPERNOWNE *pseud. of*
= *David MacGregor Means.*



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TO THE BOSS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

DEDICATION

THOSE who court the favor of bosses generally present them with whatever they possess that is most rare, curious, or valuable, as fast horses, fighting cocks or dogs, choice liquors and cigars, certificates of stock, or even money, according to the dignity and taste of the personage whom they seek to profit.

For my part, my anxiety to present myself to the notice of your honor with the best proof of my devotion has not enabled me to discover, among all that I possess, anything that I account so valuable as a knowledge of the proper conduct for a boss who would maintain himself successfully ; a knowledge acquired by a long experience of modern affairs and a diligent study of the past. The observations which I have made with

all the reflection and accuracy of which I am capable are contained in the small treatise now addressed to you. And although I have not the vanity to deem it worthy of your acceptance, yet I am persuaded that your goodness will not refuse the offering. For it is certainly advantageous to have placed before you, in such a shape that you can understand it in a few hours, all the experience of political affairs which I have acquired during many years of continual meditation and suffering in the school of adversity.

You will find in this fragment neither a salacious and highly flavored style, nor any of those forcible expletives with which those who surround you are accustomed to embellish their conversation. Its interest must depend upon the importance of the subject, the solidity of the reflections, and the truth of the facts recorded.

It will perhaps appear presumptuous in me, a man without political influence, to propose rules of conduct to those who govern; but—to use the illustration of a great writer—as the painter, when about to sketch a mountainous country, places himself in the

plain, and in order to draw the scenery of a vale ascends a height, even so, I conceive, a person must be a boss to discover the nature and character of a people, and one of the people to judge properly of a boss.

Still more presumptuous would it be were I to offer these reflections in place of that celebrated treatise of the great Niccolò Machiavelli, to the study of which you undoubtedly give your days and nights. Nothing that I can contribute could ever supersede his wisdom; but where he has confined himself to sketching the outlines, it is possible for another to complete his work by filling them in. Moreover, as I shall make clear hereafter, the aims of a boss ought not to be altogether the same as those of a prince, nor are the methods to be used in guiding a democracy like those suitable for a principality. Hence, while I nowhere contradict Machiavelli, nor even venture to differ with him, I have felt it necessary to extend and adapt his plan in order to make it applicable to the present times. But I have tried to make these extensions in conformity with the original design, so that, although the workmanship may be inferior, the whole may appear

harmonious. This has seemed to me better than to attempt to build entirely anew, for the nature of men has not changed since Machiavelli wrote; and he who comes into possession of an ancient dwelling which was in the first place well planned and excellently built can seldom gain by razing it, but will rather endeavor to develop and complete it. Some things must be taken away, more added; but no lapse of time can render anything originally contrived with a wise regard for human nature altogether obsolete.

I am therefore bold enough to hope that you will accept this modest tribute out of regard to the purpose with which it is offered; and if you condescend to read it with attention you will have evidence of my ardent desire to see utilized to the best advantage those lucrative opportunities to which fortune, the favor of your fellow-citizens, and your own splendid talents have called you.

If, from your elevated position, you should condescend to look down upon a person in my humble state, you will see how long and how unworthily I have been persecuted by the extreme and unrelenting malevolence of fortune.

H. C.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE MODERN MUNICIPALITY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

ALL municipalities in this country differ in their constitution from all those that do now subsist, or that have heretofore subsisted, in any of the other countries of the earth. All these other cities, whether ancient or modern, are or have been ruled either by princes, or by nobles, or by such of the inhabitants as are either rich or at least do not count upon wages for their support. But the government of every city in this country is carried on through the institution of manhood or universal suffrage, as it is called. Under this institution the vote of every one in making laws and in choosing rulers is of the same weight, whatever his birth or wealth, or however he obtains his support; and whoever receives the votes of the greater number of the people is lawfully their ruler. But in

every city the number of those who count chiefly upon their wages for support is either greater than that of all the other citizens or not very much less ; so that the common people are able, when they are united, to choose such rulers and to make such laws as please them.

Yet this is not altogether true ; for the municipality in this country is not entirely independent, like the principalities, or most of them, whereof Machiavelli wrote. It is partly governed by the legislature of the state or commonwealth in which the municipality is situated ; nor is it entirely, although nearly, free from the supervision and interference of the general government of the United States. Because of this regulation by outside rulers many things, as I shall presently show, must be ordered differently from what they would otherwise be, and the conduct of the boss must be altered. But, except for this interference, the common people of the great cities of this country are by law entitled to control their government. There are perhaps in some other countries municipalities that have apparently a like government ; but this is so only in name, for

they are more subject to interference from outside powers. Thus the city of Paris, in France, may seem to be governed by rulers chosen by the inhabitants, but in reality it is governed by the rulers of the nation. But the city of New York is governed chiefly by rulers chosen by its own inhabitants, and the same is true of nearly all the cities of this country.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE TRUE RULER OF THE AMERICAN MUNICIPALITY.

EVERY city where all the inhabitants have an equal voice in the elections, when it becomes great, is ruled by a boss; for the inhabitants, being generally engaged in necessary work, have little time to consult as to the manner after which, or the men by whom, they desire to be governed; moreover their numbers are so great that they cannot know one another, and it is impossible for them all, or for any great part of them, to meet together in one place for deliberation. Therefore they cannot agree upon any particular man for their ruler, for no man is known to all of them; nor can they determine upon any plan whereby they will be governed. On this account many of them take no part in the elections, every man thinking that he can do nothing by himself, and that he will fare the

same no matter who the rulers are. But the common people for the most part do not fail to vote, for the poorest of them considers that upon the day of election his voice is equal to that of the wealthiest citizen, in establishing the laws and in determining how he will be ruled ; and they care less for the nature of the laws or the character of their rulers than they do to boast that they have made and chosen them of their own free will. From which we see that the nature of men is the same in a modern city as in an ancient principality or monarchy ; for the Hebrews would have a king to rule over them, although they were warned that his rule would be more oppressive than that of the priests, for no other reason than to prove that their priests could not control them ; and so the people of Spain welcomed back Ferdinand joyously, in spite of his being altogether depraved as a man and oppressive as a king, because they would not allow Napoleon to put over them a king whom they had not chosen, although his rule would have been better.

X But some sharp-sighted men, considering how these things are, combine secretly with one another, and put forth before the time

of the election the names of such men as they desire for rulers. By combining in this way they generally make sure of success, for the rest of the inhabitants, having no organization, must, if they vote at all, vote for such rulers as are thus offered them, or else vote uselessly for such as each one prefers. From which it is apparent that the rulers of the city, although they are elected by the people, are really determined beforehand by certain men who give their attention to matters of this kind; and the people, however free they may think themselves, do but carry out the will of these men.

But in a great city the number of these shrewd men is large, and, if they are to continue to be able to direct the whole people, they must in their turn agree beforehand among themselves; which can only be by their submitting to one man who is the best able to bring this agreement to pass. For it is as true in political as it is in military affairs, that no body of men can accomplish anything without a leader, to whose orders they submit without delay or question. Nor is the reason of this hard to see, since a great number either of sheep or of men cannot act to-

gether except by imitation. For to explain to them the end that it is desirable to attain, and to discuss with them the means for attaining it, and to postpone action until all have come to an agreement in their opinion, would be an interminable task. Quick action is commonly necessary, and it does not admit of deliberation, or the statement of reasons, or waiting to hear opinions. The proper course to take must be decided upon without hesitation, and therefore the final decision must rest with one man; for if there were several of equal power they might not agree, and the battle or the opportunity would be lost.

Accordingly those who write of the art of war say that one bad general who has the supreme command will succeed better than several good ones of coördinate powers; for he may act unwisely, but they will not act at all. Hence it is a universal rule that in any body of men that is to act promptly and with effect there must be some ruler and true monarch; and such a body will always in the end overcome a body opposed to it that does not submit to such leadership. Now in the American city this leader of the

men who make it their business to determine who the rulers shall be is called a boss. The apparent rulers are indeed chosen by the people, but the boss is the true ruler, by virtue of his courage and ability, and he governs through the apparent rulers.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A PRINCE AND AN ELECTED RULER.

AN hereditary prince differs altogether in outward appearance and conduct from the chosen ruler of a municipality; for a prince is looked upon by some of his subjects as ruling by the grace of God, and as being by nature higher than other men, and by most of the rest as ruling by a prescriptive title which it is more mischievous to dispute than to accept. Therefore it is true, as Blackstone says, that the law ascribes to the prince not only large powers and emoluments, but likewise certain attributes of a great and transcendent nature, by which the people are led to consider him in the light of a superior being, and to pay him that awful respect which may enable him with greater ease to carry on the business of government.

Hence a prince may do many things, both evil and good, that other men may not. Thus it is expected of him that he shall be magnificent in his display of wealth, and he may therefore exact more from his subjects if he is lavish than if he is penurious; for they think his splendor is in some way their own, and take pride in it. And if no extraordinary vices render him odious, as Machiavelli says, he may indulge his desires as he will, and yet engross the inclination and regard of his subjects. Thus in France Louis XIV caused the greatest misery to his people by his extravagance and aggressive wars, yet he was not only tolerated but admired by them for the glory he brought to the nation; and Henry IV, who seldom denied himself any pleasure, or refrained from the common vices of men, is the best beloved of all the rulers of that state. So we read, in one of the tales of Sir Walter Scott, of certain virtuous maiden ladies who not only harbored the Pretender, Charles Stuart, at the peril of their lives, because they thought him their lawful prince, but also gave shelter to his harlot, although ordinarily they had as lief sinned themselves as come near her.

But in the constitution of the modern city no man is regarded as superior by nature or by birth or by position to the rest, but all are equal. The rulers that are chosen are looked upon by the people less as their superiors than as their servants, and they are fond of deposing such rulers frequently, in order that they may show their power. These rulers have in the view of the law no attributes of a great and transcendent nature, they do not dare to exhibit great wealth or magnificence for fear of the jealousy of their fellow-citizens, and the latter will not permit their rulers to indulge even in those vices which they practise themselves without making complaints of their offended virtue. Hence it is not desirable for any man of ambition to be a chosen ruler, at least for a long time. For if he endeavor to rule in reality as well as in appearance he is at once hated and put in peril of the law, and another is presently chosen in his place; and if he does not try to rule in reality, he can do nothing but carry out laws made by others for the very purpose of hindering him and restraining his action. In such a career no man of ambition can take delight. But ambitious

men, when not born to the rule of principalities, have always desired to make themselves princes, seeing that the hereditary prince who rules in reality may do whatever he desires, and be at the same time beloved, or not detested — such men not considering how great is the importance of age to a dynasty. On the other hand, princes that have not been ambitious have often been overthrown and supplanted.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN HEREDITARY PRINCE AND A BOSS.

FROM what has been said it is evident that there is little likeness between an hereditary prince and a boss; for it is the peculiarity of the rule of a boss that it is neither recognized by the laws, nor openly admitted to exist even by the boss himself. So that it is absurd to speak of a boss as being a ruler by nature higher than other men, seeing that he does not proclaim himself to be a ruler at all. Upon this account he can make no display of a retinue or any of the magnificence of a prince, having no subjects, and being the apparent head of no principality. The law ascribes to him neither large powers and emoluments nor any attributes of a great and transcendent nature. Therefore he cannot take the first place at banquets or balls or

entertainments given to distinguished persons that visit his city; for why should he? He is not the elected ruler of the city, and he does not let it be declared that he is the real ruler. He has no title and represents no trade or profession. Therefore he must be content to let others take the places of honor at all public feasts, and this he can do because he knows that the power is his; for he is really the first who determines who shall be apparently the first.

As he can make no display as a ruler, he must beware of ostentation as a private man. The reason of this is that the peculiar danger of a boss is envy; and if he build himself a palace, and have many servants wearing livery, and display a coat of arms, and seem to spend great sums of money in ostentation, he immediately arouses the envy of those who think they have raised him to power by their efforts. They consider that he is in nothing superior to them except in good fortune, and that they are equally entitled with him to share in the revenues which he collects; and they are therefore always ready to plot against him if they think they can succeed. Therefore, while the magnificence

of a prince delights the subjects, the luxury of a boss makes them discontented and angry; and this is especially true of those who are his followers. They do not, like the retainers of an hereditary prince, think that his magnificence reflects glory upon them; rather do they look upon it as plunder which the whole army has earned but which the general has kept for himself. But from the time of Achilles and Agamemnon to this day there has always been danger to generals from the division of the spoils. A wise boss will, then, make little display of wealth, more especially because it is in his power to accumulate and possess it secretly; and he will attend to Aristotle's warning, that the haughtiness of women has been the ruin of many tyrannies. He will therefore not permit the women of his family to treat others haughtily or to insist upon precedence at feasts and tournaments, or balls as they are called, given to princes and other distinguished guests of the city. It is better for him to deal with rebellion in his own house rather than to allow the arrogance of his women to stir it up outside; and he who cannot hold the women of his family in subjection is not fit to be the ruler

over a city. Let the boss therefore grasp the substance and disregard the shadow: since he is not the apparent ruler, but the real ruler, let him also be content to be really supreme in power without appearing so.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE LIKENESS BETWEEN THE NEW PRINCE AND THE BOSS.

MACHIAVELLI writes of many things that do not greatly concern a boss. Thus he speaks of mixed principalities, or such as are annexed as appendages to another sovereignty, but it seldom happens in this country that one great city is annexed to another; although were the city of Brooklyn to be annexed to the city of New York that boss would be guilty of a capital error who failed to observe what Machiavelli lays down upon this point. But, for the present at least, I will not consider it. Machiavelli further discourses of those who from a private station have ascended to the dignity of princes by the favor of fortune alone; but were it possible for any man to attain the position of a boss in this way he would be at once overthrown, for the difficulty of this form of gov-

ernment is so great that no good fortune could sustain a boss who had no talent. As Machiavelli says, even if such men meet with few difficulties in their progress, they encounter many in maintaining their sovereignty.

Such were the Roman emperors who from a private station attained to the empire by corrupting the soldiery, for they were supported only by the pleasure and fortune of those who advanced them — two foundations equally uncertain and insecure. They had neither the experience nor the power necessary to maintain their position. Unless men possess superior genius or courage, how can those who have themselves always been accustomed to a private station know in what manner to govern others? Deficient in knowledge, they will be equally destitute of power, for want of supporters on whose attachment and fidelity they can depend. Such domination, like other things in nature of premature and rapid growth, does not take sufficient root in the minds of men, but must fall with the first stroke of adversity; unless, indeed, the ruler so unexpectedly exalted possess such superior talents that he can discover at once the means of preserving his good fortune, and

afterward maintain it by having recourse to the same measures which others had adopted before him. But it is better to leave fortune out of account, for a boss must not think that fortune will favor him, else he will neglect necessary precautions; neither should he believe that fortune is against him, for no great success in ruling is likely to be attained by him who expects to fail.

Neither need we at this time consider what Machiavelli says of him who by foreign arms acquires sovereignty; for the force employed by a boss is not an armed force, and since his rule is secret it is not easy to call in forces from outside, because they must act openly. Nevertheless it is not prudent for a boss to neglect anything that Machiavelli has written, as appeared lately from the example of Boss Billy Sheehan of Buffalo, who, instead of ruling by means of his own followers there, thought to strengthen himself by calling in the aid of the legislature and the governor of the state, by which means he involved himself in complete ruin.

But when Machiavelli comes to speak of private persons who have attained sovereignty without any special aid from fortune,

whom he calls new princes, he lays down rules which are as important for the boss of this day as for the prince of the time when he wrote; for he observes, in his chapter entitled "Of Those who have Obtained Sovereignty by their Crimes," that they are indebted neither to fortune nor to virtue. Thus Agathocles of Syracuse was of the lowest class, the son of a potter, of dissolute and wicked conduct in every relation of life; but he had such infinite ability and so much courage, as well as strength of mind and body, that after he had risen to be prætor he was able to hold by violence what had been granted to him by the public voice. This was not owing to favor, but to his own genius; still, as Machiavelli says, it must not be called virtue to murder one's fellow-citizens, and to sacrifice one's friends, and to be insensible to the voice of faith, pity, or religion. But Oliverotto da Fermo deserves not to be put on an equality with Agathocles by Machiavelli, for he suffered himself to be deceived by Borgia, and was strangled before his rule had lasted two years; but Agathocles never trusted any one and thus was never betrayed. But after a boss has attained sovereignty he

cannot continue to commit crimes of violence; and it is doubtful if it is not wiser to avoid them, so far as possible, when he is struggling to attain it, so much milder are our manners than those of our ancestors. However, many of our bosses have risen to power in this way.

Machiavelli further observes, in his chapter upon "Civil Principalities," that a private individual may attain power by the favor of his fellow-citizens, and without either violence or treason. Such a sovereignty, he says, is not to be acquired either by merit or fortune alone, but by a lucky sort of craft. And he elsewhere says that it very rarely happens, or perhaps never occurs, that a person exalts himself from a humble station to great power without employing either force or fraud, unless he attains it by gift or hereditary succession. Again, he says that there is no instance on record of a man who from an obscure station arrived at great power by the single means of open and avowed force, although he has seen others succeed by cunning alone.

Moreover he shows that Xenophon, in his Life of Cyrus, deduced the inference that a prince who would make himself great must

learn the art of deceiving. So it was with the Romans, for they had recourse from the very beginning to treachery and bad faith; and Machiavelli says this is always necessary for those who desire to establish their dominion over others. From all this it appears plain to me that the rules for the conduct of a boss are very nearly the same as those for the conduct of him whom Machiavelli calls the new prince; and, indeed, whoever reads his discourse will see that if he had addressed a boss he would for the most part not have written otherwise.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE TEACHING OF ARISTOTLE CONCERNING TYRANTS.

IT is evident to me that Machiavelli had no knowledge of the book that Aristotle wrote upon politics; for if he had read it he would have said certain things he has not said, and as to certain other things he would have referred to Aristotle as their author. But, since they agree very nearly in what they say, it seems that they probably say what is true; for if Machiavelli was a wise man, Aristotle was even wiser. Accordingly, when we find that Aristotle calls a certain ruler a tyrant, and Machiavelli speaks of a ruler of the same kind as a prince who has made himself sovereign from a private station, we may say that such a prince is the same as a tyrant, and that what Aristotle says of tyrants will be true of new princes;

and the same things will for the most part be true of bosses.

This does not admit of doubt to one who compares what these writers say ; for Aristotle defines a tyranny as existing where one rules over his equals and superiors without being accountable for his conduct, his object being his own advantage and not the advantage of those whom he governs. He also says that the tyrant aims at wealth and pleasure rather than honor and virtue, but that he ought to order his life so that his manners may not appear contrary to virtue, or at least not wholly bad, but only in part. Now all these things are to be found also in Machiavelli's works, as when he praises Cæsar Borgia, who put to death all who he thought injured him, and kept faith with no one, but relied upon artifice and dissimulation ; for Machiavelli offers him as a model for every one who would secure himself in a new principality. He further declares that the manner in which men live is so different from that in which they ought to live that he who endeavors to act as duty dictates necessarily insures his own destruction ; and he reasons that the prince who wishes to maintain his power

ought to learn that he should not be always good.

Many other things of like import he says, which I shall take up more at length hereafter, all of which prove beyond any question that he regarded the prince as ruling for his own advantage and not for that of others. Accordingly, when Aristotle describes the tyrant, and Machiavelli the new prince, they are both speaking of the same kind of ruler; and we know that the boss is also the same, for how can he be described otherwise than as one who rules for his own advantage? Accordingly the tyrant and the new prince and the boss are the same, and nearly all the rules of conduct appropriate for one of them are appropriate also for the others.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE CHIEF AIM OF THE BOSS.

WHAT Aristotle and Machiavelli have said leaves no doubt of the correctness of maintaining that the purpose of the boss is to secure his own advantage. But if we inquire in what this consists we find that it is not in all respects the same as that of the prince or the tyrant; for they are open rulers, but the boss is a secret one. Hence we saw that it was not wise for a boss to appear in great magnificence before the public, or to make great display of wealth in his manner of living. It is also true that the boss cannot hope to make his rule hereditary, which can sometimes be done by the new prince and the tyrant; for, as they rule openly, men may after a time grow used to their dominion, and cease to remember any other. Both Aristotle and Machiavelli give examples to show that this may take place, and the people

come to accept the rule of the heir as natural. But this can never be the case with the rule of a boss, for, because it is not an open rule, it cannot engage the affections of men, nor can their imaginations be impressed with what is always kept out of sight. Even of the tyrant Aristotle says that although he may preserve the supreme power after he has raised himself to it, yet he cannot easily transmit it; for those to whom it is transmitted are apt to fall into an effeminate way of life, and, by growing despicable, to offer many opportunities to conspirators.

What was true among the Greeks, when he wrote, is still more true among the Americans of the present time; for, if a father has talents, he is so much concerned in getting wealth that he leaves the education of his sons to others; and his sons, thinking they will receive the wealth gathered by their father, take no thought of maintaining themselves, but are indolent and dissolute. This is especially true of bosses, for their position is so difficult to maintain that they must give their whole time to it, and not be cumbered with the education of children. It is not likely, therefore, that their children will be

fit to rule, for the children of those who have talents are not often distinguished, at least in the same way as their parents, and the rule of the boss cannot be handed from one to another, as in an hereditary kingdom, but can be acquired only by the same talents by which it is maintained. So that it is folly for a boss to aim to make his rule hereditary.

Nor will he aim to establish permanently a certain method or system of ruling. It is true that the clergy of the Roman Church, and more particularly those of the religious orders, such as the Society of Jesus, who have no offspring and therefore cannot expect to continue their rule in their own families, yet strive most earnestly to make the power of their orders enduring after they are dead. To this end they labor strenuously, and suffer all manner of privations and torments, and even sacrifice their lives. But they do this believing that it is for the greater glory of God, as they say, and that they will thus secure their own eternal felicity; but it is absurd for a boss to think of such things, or to believe that God will reward him when he is dead for pursuing his own advantage when he was living, and for striving to make

it possible for others to do the same. Neither Aristotle nor Machiavelli anywhere say that the prince or the tyrant need have regard to the gods, or think that he should concern himself about what may happen to him after he is dead ; and if any man is troubled with cares of this kind, let him not think to be a boss, for he is not fit.

Aristotle says, indeed, that the tyrant should seem to pay particular attention to the worship of the gods, and that this must be done so as to give no suspicion of hypocrisy. But he makes it plain that the only object of this is to make the citizens believe that the tyrant has the gods on his side, and that they have less to fear while he who governs them is religious and reverences the gods ; and the same is true of the boss, as I shall show hereafter. Machiavelli, also, says that the prince should endeavor to gain the reputation of piety, although self-preservation will often compel him to violate the laws of religion ; from this it plainly appears that his opinion was the same as that of Aristotle.

What, then, should the boss aim at, if he is not to strive to establish his family, or to have a palace and live magnificently, or to

perpetuate the order or society through which he gained the government, or to obtain the affection of his subjects? If he can have none of these things, will he not be wiser to forego ruling and seek a mode of life having more pleasure? Not if he is a man of ambition; to such a man, ruling is itself a sufficient pleasure. His aim, therefore, is not different from that of the new prince, although there are many pleasures denied to him that the prince may have without peril so long as he makes it his chief end to rule. But the exercise of power over the persons and fortunes of many will always be in itself a sufficient end and a sufficient occupation for the ambitious man; and if he cannot content himself with this, but must yield to the temptations of smaller pleasures, he will not long be troubled with the cares of sovereignty. This is what is meant by Aristotle when he tells the tyrant to take good care of only one thing, namely, the power, that not only the willing, but the unwilling also, shall submit to it; for if he once lose this his tyranny is at an end. The aim of a boss is, therefore, not to live luxuriously and ostentatiously, but to attain power and to possess it so long as he lives.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE NOBLES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN CITIES.

AS to the manner in which a boss is to raise himself to sovereign power, it is not altogether easy to determine this from what is said by the older writers. Machiavelli declares that the sovereignty is obtained by the favor either of the people or of the nobility ; for the different parties in a state are reduced to these two elements, one springing from the aversion of the people to the oppressive government of the nobles, the other from the desire of these latter to govern and oppress the people. Hence he lays it down that a principality emanates either from the nobles or from the people, according as it operates to their advantage respectively ; for when the former are too weak to cope with the people they have often no other means of subduing them than by advancing from their own class

one whom they nominate prince, that under the mark of an acknowledged authority they may indulge their desire for domination. The people, likewise, when they can no longer resist the oppression of the nobles, throw all their power into the hands of one person alone, and appoint him prince to defend and protect them.

Aristotle, also, says that a tyrant is chosen out of the meanest populace as an enemy to the nobles, that the common people may not be oppressed by them; and that the generality of tyrants were mere demagogues who gained credit with the people by inveighing against the nobles. But he also says that some princes have become tyrants, and that some oligarchies have been changed into tyrannies, and that such was the rise of almost all the ancient tyrannies of Sicily; so that he seems to say nearly the same thing as Machiavelli. But since both these writers speak of a class of citizens called nobles, and say nothing of the boss, some may think they say nothing to the point; for such persons say there are no nobles in our cities. But those who say this are deceived; for it does not follow because a certain name is no

longer used that the thing which formerly bore that name has ceased to exist. But wise men will inquire into things rather than names, and if they find that a thing known to them by a certain name is in all, or nearly all, respects the same as something known to former writers by a different name, they will conclude that it is the same thing. Thus Machiavelli, as we have seen, does not use the name tyrant, but the account that he gives of the new prince shows that he was the same ruler that Aristotle called a tyrant.

And many persons in our own country seem to think that if a few men overthrow the government of a monarch and make themselves rulers, calling the new government a republic, therefore it is a government like our own, although it may be in reality an oligarchy or a despotism. So also many persons have mourned with Cicero, when they have read his laments concerning the downfall of the Roman republic, and the loss of their liberties by the Roman people, thinking that he had in mind a government in which all the people had a voice; whereas the Roman republic was then a corrupt oligarchy, and what we mean by the people

were not thought of by Cicero under that name at all. Accordingly we must inquire whether there is any class in our cities that takes the same part and has the same character as the class called the nobility by the older writers ; for if we find such a class, then probably many of the things will be true of it which were said of the nobility by Aristotle and Machiavelli.

Now the real distinction and essence of those called nobles at all times has been this, that they have thought that they should rule over the people and that the people should maintain them, desiring above all things that others should labor so that they might live without labor. Many other things may also be truly said of nobles, but they are all true because of their connection with this principle. Thus the nobles say that they are of higher birth than the common people, but they mean by this only that their fathers before them did no labor, but compelled the people to labor for them ; and the titles that they assume are explained in the same way, for they generally arise from the affection of their followers, or from the lands which the nobles have owned but which the people

have tilled for them. Accordingly, so soon as a noble is no longer sustained by others, but is compelled to work for others in order to live, he ceases to be regarded as a noble, and if he clings to his title he becomes ridiculous. Such are those counts and barons that come hither from other countries where they have become impoverished; for while they are admired by a few foolish persons, especially women, the generality laugh at them. Hence it is always the mark of the noble that he seeks to rule so that he may be supported by others.

Now no one will say that there is no class of persons in our cities desiring to rule in order that they may live at the charge of the people; for there is such a class, and those who belong to it are called politicians. Therefore, since those whom we call politicians are nearly the same as those called nobles by Aristotle and Machiavelli, what they say of nobles is likely to be true, or nearly so, of politicians. It is a proof of this, if more proof be needed, that these politicians also have titles as the nobles do. Some of these are titles of affection. Such was the case with a politician in the city of New York who was

called Prince Hal, like the prince of whom Shakespeare wrote ; and there was one called the Plumed Knight, like Henry of Navarre, and another called Blue-eyed Billy. There was also one called Fatty, like Charles the Fat of France, and one called the Bald Eagle of Westchester, like Charles the Bald. Another was called the Silver-Tongued Orator, like Nestor the Pylion ; and many more could be mentioned. Some of them, also, have titles from the regions or countries where they are powerful and whence they draw their support — such as the Boss of Coney Island, the Boss of Rensselaerswyck, the Boss of Syracuse, and many others.

Yet there is this difference between the noble and the politician, that as the noble generally receives wealth from his ancestors, while the politician is poor, the noble is often less rapacious than the politician ; for it is not necessary for the noble to live at the expense of the people, although it is desirable, but for the politician it is both desirable and necessary. Moreover the noble is sometimes restrained by haughtiness, and sometimes urged on, thinking himself a superior being to the commonalty, because neither he nor

his ancestors have sold their labor; but the politician is neither restrained nor animated by pride or honor, but is moved only by hunger and greed. There are other differences which I could add, but, as they are not material, let these suffice; for in their relation to the government the noble and the politician are essentially alike.

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE PEOPLE IN THE ANCIENT AND IN THE MODERN CITY.

IN speaking of nobles I pointed out that we should not be deceived by a difference of names, and think that because a certain name is no longer used therefore the thing has disappeared. But it is equally necessary to observe that we may be deceived by finding the same name used when the thing has become changed. Thus, as we have seen, both Aristotle and Machiavelli speak of the people of a city as the only other class besides the nobility; and so a thoughtless person would consider that when we speak of the people of a city at the present time we mean the same thing as these writers. But it is a mistake to think this; for in the cities whereof Aristotle wrote the slaves and some others were not reckoned among the people, and had no voice in making the laws and choos-

ing the rulers, so that perhaps not one tenth of the men dwelling in such a city had the suffrage; whereas in the modern city in this country all men have it. And the same thing is partly true of the cities of Italy which Machiavelli had in mind; for although there were no slaves, at least by that name, yet very many of the inhabitants were not freemen or citizens, and had no part in the government.

Now when we speak of the people we mean all the inhabitants, or all the male adults, except the politicians. But that a government by such a people as this could exist in a city would probably not have seemed credible to either Aristotle or Machiavelli. For they thought that a people such as they knew could hardly be restrained from plundering the rich if it became possessed of the government; and they would have said that if the power was obtained by the very poorest, such as slaves and outlaws, the city would be at once destroyed by their excesses. And perhaps this might be so were our cities independent, like those known to these writers; for they knew little of cities that were subject not only to one state but to two, which is the case with our cities. By

this means not only are the people greatly restrained, but the politicians also. Accordingly in our cities both the rich and the poor are commonly meant when we speak of the people, and the classes are not two, as reckoned by Aristotle and Machiavelli, namely, the nobles and the people, but three — the politicians, the rich, and the poor.

e? { In another respect the people of a modern city differs much from the people of an ancient city, or from one of the middle ages — namely, in being very much greater in numbers. For some of the Greek cities had but a few hundred citizens, and the Italian cities were not very much larger; nor was there any city of those times that had one tenth as many citizens as the city of New York now has. But the results of this, as I said at the outset, are very important; for where there is so great a congregation of men they cannot act as one body, either in choosing rulers, or in making laws, or in deliberating about what is best to be done; for at the most not more than two or three thousand men can be gathered in one hall so as to hear one orator, nor are there many orators that can be heard by a greater number in

the open air. Moreover no man can be acquainted with more than a few hundred others, and most of these he cannot know well. Hence in a great city it may be said that no one knows the wishes or desires of many of the citizens, and it often falls out that the greater number of them desire the same thing, but cannot bring it about because they are ignorant of their own agreement.

Accordingly it is necessary that the citizens should be divided into small groups according to districts, in order that the government may not become unmanageable, and that they should make laws not directly, but by means of delegates. From this it has come to pass that most of the citizens who reflect at all upon these matters believe it impossible for those who desire to improve the government to be united and to combine for that purpose. Herein lies the strength and opportunity of the politicians; for they can unite, being few and acquainted with one another, and having nothing else to engage their attention; but the multitude cannot. Neither can the multitude have any leaders, at least for any long time, except the politicians. But the politicians can be their leaders,

since they reward themselves with the offices ; and whoever becomes a leader of the people, expecting to be repaid for his labor with office, is a politician, as I have already shown.

It will not seem surprising that the multitude should be led in this way, if we consider that poor men cannot leave their work and give their time to public affairs and to deliberations and the like, because of their poverty ; and the rich will not. For the rich have their own pleasures, and take little delight in mingling with the people and humbling themselves and pretending to think the poor equal in wisdom and virtue to themselves, not thinking truly any such thing. But unless they do this the people will not listen to them or follow them. Some of the rich, it is true, may now and then do these things, but they do them expecting to be chosen rulers by so doing, and they are therefore politicians, although not of the needy sort. Accordingly it plainly appears both that the people must have leaders and that these leaders must be politicians ; and this is likely to remain true so long as every inhabitant of a city has an equal voice with every other in choosing the rulers and in fixing the public charges.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE DIVISION OF THE PEOPLE INTO FACTIONS OR PARTIES.

THERE are certain divisions of the people in a modern city that are different in some respects from those which generally prevailed in earlier times; at least we find little mention of anything like them in the older writers. Such are the divisions which are called in our country the Democratic and Republican parties. It is true that some writers tell us that the populace of Constantinople was divided into factions called by the names of different colors, and we know that in some Italian cities there were factions called the Blacks and the Whites. From this it might seem that the same divisions continued to our day; for the difference between our parties seems to have been on account of color, the Republicans formerly showing affection for black men, and the Democrats despising them. But

more recently the Republicans declared that the people of Hawaii, because of their black complexion, either had no rights that white men were bound to respect, or could not govern themselves, but must be ruled by white men; and the Democrats appeared to be grieved that these people should be treated as inferiors.

From this it seems probable that these divisions are for most people matters of name only, and that one man is a Democrat or a Republican because his father called himself by that name; as one man is called Smith because his father was called Smith, and yet he thinks that that name is natural to him and a part of himself, and that if he were called by another name he would be a different person. For these reasons, therefore, the greater number adhere to these parties, and, as is generally true of factions, most of those adhering to one party hate bitterly those of the other, and believe no good of them. As Thucydides said, the tie of party is stronger than that of blood, because a partizan acts without asking why. Party associations are not based upon any established law, nor do they seek the public good; they arise from

the love of power, originating in avarice and ambition, and the leaders make the public interest, to which in name they are devoted, in reality their prize.

It was probably because these divisions seemed to Aristotle and Machiavelli trifling and irrational that they make no mention of them; but in our cities they are not trifling. As I have pointed out, the cities of which these writers discoursed were independent, or nearly so, and did not receive their laws from states of which they were members. But the American city is a part not only of the state in which it is situated, but also of the Union of states, or the nation; and the two parties of which I spoke are called national parties, because they prevail throughout the whole nation. The greater part of the people are so devoted to them that when a ruler, such as a governor or a judge, or even a mayor or an alderman, is to be chosen, and when candidates have been proposed, every one immediately desires to know the candidate of his own party, and votes for him without regard to his character or fitness for the place.

This is so partly because it is easier to find

out what a man is called than what he really is, but principally because men become wonted and attached to any organization with which they act, like soldiers to a regiment, and grow reluctant either to break old ties or to form new ones. Loyalty is with most men stronger than reason. They find it impossible to act with certain others in one contest, and against them in another; for they cannot strive without becoming incensed at their antagonists, and they cannot forget their anger and hatred. Moreover every one fears that if he should vote for a mayor who was not of his party because he would rule better, and he should be chosen, those of the other party would boast and declare that he was chosen because the people desired that his party should triumph. Again, the generality of mankind have no leisure to inquire into public affairs or the merits of their rulers. They cannot consider difficult questions of policy at every election, but must decide once for all which party they will adhere to, and having taken it, as a man his wife, for better, for worse, they must cleave to it so long as they live. Hence many men will vote for the candidate of their own party even when they

know him to be a bad man, thinking it to be upon the whole the less of two evils.

Nothing, it is obvious, can afford a more favorable opportunity to a boss than this devotion of men to their party organizations. He has only to gain control of the organization of the stronger party, and then he can bring forward such men to be rulers as he desires, confident that most of those who call themselves by that party name will give them their support. As to the manner in which a boss may gain control of a party organization, it will be necessary to speak more at length hereafter; but it is evident that the name of the party organization in no way concerns the boss, except that he must take care to belong to the party which numbers most in his own city, for otherwise he cannot maintain himself. Accordingly we see that a boss in Pennsylvania is generally of one party, but a boss in New York of another. And if one party greatly outnumbers the other, then it is easy for a boss to rule a long time; while if the parties are nearly equal in numbers, it will be very difficult, yet not altogether impossible. Let no one suppose, therefore, because the parties have no differ-

ence except in name, or are concerned wholly with measures to be adopted by the nation, and not with the government of the cities, that it follows that they have nothing to do with choosing rulers for the cities; for it is not true that men are not moved by names, since they are for the most part altogether ruled by them. This also was true when Machiavelli wrote, because he might have spoken much of the parties called the Guelphs and the Ghibellines in the Italian cities, which set the people by the ears in municipal affairs, although they had properly nothing to do with the city government.

Since it has been necessary to refer to parties, it is desirable to speak of the manner in which they are constituted or organized. Upon this matter neither Aristotle nor Machiavelli has, apparently, anything to say; but really when they speak of a military force they are saying what is in point; for when Machiavelli mentions an armed force as necessary for the prince, he means such a force as will enable him to maintain himself, and at the time when he wrote it was necessary that such a force should be armed. But at the present time no boss has need of such a force,

or could use it if he had it; for in the first place, as I have before said, he is a secret ruler and cannot make himself prominent; and, what is more important, because the city is outwardly ruled by the majority of voters, as we say, in a peaceful manner, and not by armed men. Indeed, if any city were openly ruled by armed men, the government of the state would interpose and meet arms with arms. What is important, therefore, either to a prince or to a boss, is that he should have a force upon which he can depend sufficient to enable him to prevail. Provided the end is attained, it is immaterial whether the means employed by this force is arms or voices or anything else.

Now the great need of any number of men, if they are to accomplish anything by acting in common, is to be organized and disciplined. If they are soldiers, they must learn to obey their leaders without any deliberation or inquiry or hesitation; for this is the end of all discipline, that a great number may act in accordance with the plan and will of one mind. A few such soldiers, if properly led, will put to flight a great multitude not accustomed to listen to orders or to obey them promptly.

For the greater the number the weaker the army, unless they all act as one man toward a common end; since otherwise they hinder and delay one another. It is true that a great number of men may agree to act in a certain way after deliberation, and because they find that they all desire the same thing; and when this happens it may be difficult for either a prince or a boss to maintain himself. But even in such a case it is necessary for this multitude to submit to leaders and to obey them without question; for otherwise their whole time would be passed in discussion and they would accomplish nothing.

From all this it plainly appears that parties must have organization and discipline; and, since there are everywhere two parties, there must be in every city two organizations, as they are called, each organization having its own leaders. These leaders, moreover, since they give their time and labor to the discipline of their forces and to the contests for power, and are at the same time poor, must obtain their living in some way through this occupation; for no one would pay them wages for such other work as they could do when thus engaged. Accordingly they gen-

erally hope to be made public officers, and hence they are politicians, as we have said. If they do not obtain offices, they must be supported by those who do obtain them, or in some secret way by their party, having no other resource. As this support is precarious, they are often corruptible, and it is therefore necessary for a boss not only to control strictly the organization of his own party, but also to pay careful attention to the character of the politicians belonging to the organization of the party opposed to him.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THOSE THROUGH WHOM A BOSS ATTAINS SOVEREIGNTY.

LET us now return to what Machiavelli says of the manner in which a private person may attain sovereignty through the favor of his fellow-citizens. He declares that the sovereign power is obtained by favor of the people or of the nobility ; and we have to inquire whether in our cities a boss may rise by the favor either of the people or of the politicians. But after what has been explained concerning the people, it will be evident that a boss can seldom rise through their favor, and that he cannot maintain himself if he should so rise ; for the people are necessarily led by politicians. Hence much that Machiavelli says of the advantage of attaining sovereignty by the popular favor is not true concerning a boss ; for if he would rise by favor of the peo-

ple he must do nothing except enforce the laws, and this would often be not only unprofitable to him, but presently also unsafe. Therefore it may be conceded, as Machiavelli says, that if a boss could attain power by the will of the people, he would find no one to resist him, and would not need to do injustice, and could maintain himself so long as he preserved the affection of his subjects; but it is idle to repeat this, for a boss does not attain power in any such manner.

A boss, then, must attain power through the politicians. But what Machiavelli says of the nobles is true of the politicians, that, although a boss is raised by their favor, he will find much difficulty in supporting himself, because he will be surrounded by men who, as they think themselves still his equals, submit reluctantly to his authority. It is also true that the people could be contented without the exercise of injustice by a boss, but not the politicians; the latter seeking to practise tyranny, the former merely to avoid it. So it is true that when the people cease to favor any man they simply desert him, while the politicians may not only desert, but also conspire against him; for as they generally have

more penetration than the common people, they are likely to secure themselves in time by going over to the more fortunate competitors. Yet in spite of this I do not hesitate to say that a boss must not only gain power through the favor of the politicians, but must also retain it through them ; although he must beware of driving the people to revolt by oppression.

To explain the subject more fully, as Machiavelli has done, let us examine the two points of view in which a boss ought to consider his politicians ; and first, whether they are entirely attached to his fortune or not. Those who give him proofs of their zeal and devotion deserve his honor and esteem, provided they are not rapacious. But those who do not, perhaps have no other motive for their coolness than a natural timidity and want of spirit. In this case he may employ them, and that with great advantage, particularly if they are able in counsel, for then they will honor him in prosperity, and in adversity they will do him no injury. But when they keep aloof, from ambition or some other latent cause, it is a proof that they more regard their own welfare than that of the boss. He therefore

ought to consider them as declared enemies, who, not content with abandoning his interests, would not hesitate, in adversity, to take hostile measures against him.

Yet it is partly true that a boss, although he be advanced by the politicians and against the will of the people, should strive to gain their attachment; nor is this very difficult, if he will protect them against those who seek to oppress them. For the people desire little more of their rulers than security from oppression, and as it is natural, when we receive favors from those from whom we expected only evil, to feel more obliged to such benefactors, so the attachment of the people to a boss who treats them well will be more certain than if he had attained his rank by their aid. As Machiavelli says, let no one quote the old proverb against me, that he who relies upon the people builds his house upon the sand. This may be true in the case of a single citizen opposed to powerful enemies or oppressed by the magistrates, as happened to the Gracchi at Rome; but a boss who is not deficient in courage and who is able to command — who, not dejected by ill fortune nor deficient in necessary preparations, knows how

to preserve order in his city by his own wisdom and ability — need never repent having laid the foundation of his security on his people's affections. If he succeeds in doing so, the knowledge will tend more than any other influence that he can bring to bear to make the politicians submissive to his authority.

CHAPTER XII.

OF SOME PECULIARITIES IN THE SITUATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND IN ITS POPULATION.

WE must now proceed for a time in our inquiry without the aid of Machiavelli, for the city of New York, with which we are principally concerned, not only differs from the cities known to him, as do other modern cities, but it also differs from all other modern cities in several most important particulars. Therefore it is not strange that the government of this city should be in certain respects different from that of any other. Of the wealth of this city I need not speak at any length. By its situation it is clearly destined to be the greatest city of the world, and it will levy toll upon the merchandise of all the nations of the earth. The boss that can make this city tributary to him, therefore, will have all mankind

for his subjects ; and to rule over such a realm in this way is a sufficient end for the most ambitious man.

It is true that certain ignorant writers reason as if the opulence of this city were due to its inhabitants, and not to its situation, and they say that the rents received by the owners of the land belong not to them but to all the inhabitants. But the folly of this appears if we consider that the greater part both of all the goods and of all the people that come to this country from others pass through this city because of its situation ; and the same is true of what goes forth from this country. To this place all railroads desire to extend their lines ; to this place men that have gained riches come to dwell ; to this place all travelers direct their course ; to this place all that make or buy or sell goods must come to obtain materials or to procure or dispose of their wares ; and the more this is so the more it will be so.

It is absurd to suppose that these all come hither for love of the inhabitants of the city, and not because they find convenience and profit and pleasure in its situation ; for very many of these inhabitants are thieves and

beggars and dissolute persons, and such inhabitants are not a source of wealth to any city, but of poverty, requiring great outlay both to prevent their wickedness and to punish it. Accordingly I say that the great rents obtained for the lands in this city arise from its being, as it were, the center of the world, and are paid by every one that comes here even for a short period, as well as by those that dwell here all the time; and not only so, but they are paid by all those both in this country and in others that either produce or buy or sell merchandise which is brought hither.

It is evident, therefore, that it is not easy to assign a limit to the revenue that may be derived from levying taxes upon the lands in this city; for if there were no taxes the owners of the lands would receive so much the higher rents, and those that pay the rents care little whether the owners of the lands keep them for their own use and pleasure or have to divide them with their rulers. Many even say that the rulers should have them all. Accordingly it is only the owners of the lands that will complain if very great sums are exacted from them, and they are but a

small part of the inhabitants. Moreover the rents increase with the increase of the population and traffic of the world, and if the taxes are not increased quite so much the owners will not attempt to rebel ; for they do not revolt whose condition is improving, but they whose condition is growing worse. This, therefore, is the only limit to be observed by a boss in determining the amount of revenue that he will exact ; but let him beware of exceeding this limit.

If the city of New York has been favored by nature in its situation, so it seems to have been intended by its shape to be governed by a boss ; for it is principally a long and narrow island, and the traffic in it is so great that continually more space is given up to shops and warehouses and offices, and less and less to dwellings. Very great numbers come hither daily from other places, going back to their homes at night ; and the laws are such that none of these people, although they are greatly concerned in the government of the city, by reason of their whole support being obtained here, has any voice whatever in choosing the rulers or making the laws. And this shows, as I said, that the city is in-

tended by nature to be ruled by a boss, for this class of whom I have just spoken is the most dangerous of all to him. Nor is the reason of this hard to see, since these men are for the most part married, and choose to live away from the city in order that their children may have better homes and live healthier lives; for, by reason of the high rents, only the rich can afford to have separate homes of their own in the city, and all others must live in what are called apartment or tenement houses, where a number of families are sheltered under one roof.

This is not disagreeable to the brutish class, that beget children without forethought, like cattle, or to those that marry intending to have no children. But neither of these classes is dangerous to a boss, the former because it is too ignorant to know aught of government, the latter because they care little about anything except their present comfort, and are indifferent to what takes place after they are dead. But those who beget children with forethought, and are anxious about their education, and desire to accumulate wealth that their children may be provided for—these are they who are constantly disposed to pry

the matter of government, and to stir up discussion over the manner in which the public resources are expended, and to complain at the increasing of public debts; for, on behalf of their children, they are even more concerned about the future than the present, wishing their children to live better lives than themselves. Wherefore it is fortunate for the boss that not many of this class can live in the city of New York. Let him look to it, when schemes are broached for enlarging its limits, that he add not to their numbers.

It is true that among the dwellers in the city there is a class of men called reformers, most pestilent and dangerous to a boss. They are truly described by Aristotle as conspirators through ambition and not as seeing before them great gains, and they engage in attempts to overturn governments which they think unjust, as in any other noble actions, in order that they may be illustrious and distinguished among others. Their aim in destroying a tyrant is not to gain a tyranny, but renown. Fortunately for the boss, the number of those, as Aristotle says, who act upon this principle is very small; for we must suppose they regard their own welfare as nothing

in case they should not succeed. Moreover, so soon as there appears to be a chance that they will succeed, they are joined by many who say that they are reformers, but who really desire their own gains, and hope to get some share in the public revenues and the offices. Such men are not really reformers, but politicians, and they are not greatly to be feared even when they array themselves with the reformers, for they are generally corruptible; and moreover, many who know their real character think the true reformers are no better, because they act together. Hence a wise boss can generally defy the reformers; for if we leave out of our reckoning all the strangers and travelers that come to the city for a short season, all those that reside here for the most part but are not citizens, and all those that work here during the day but sleep elsewhere—and this we may do, because none of these has any voice in the government—those that are left are chiefly of a character to submit willingly to the rule of a boss.

CHAPTER XIII.

OF THE DIFFERENT RACES IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

THE population of the city of New York differs from that of nearly every other great city, in that very many of the citizens are natives neither of the city nor of this country, and it is probably true of a majority that either they or their parents have come hither from foreign lands. The number of different races is very great, but the chief of these have hitherto been the Irish and the German races. But of late there have come many Scandinavians and Bohemians and Hungarians and Poles and Russians, and especially Italians. Not a few of these still speak foreign tongues, and as they can understand neither our speech nor our laws nor our government, they care little who rules over them. With such as these it is at present easy for a boss to deal; and although in the future he may suffer much

trouble and anxiety from the rebellious disposition and discontent of these foreigners, yet, by reason of their differences of race and of language, they will be for a long time weak; for they cannot combine, but through race-hatreds they may be set one against the other. With the Italians, because they are especially dear to the pope, more difficulty may be encountered, as I shall hereafter explain. For the present, however, it is necessary to consider the Irish and the Germans, for their number is so great that through them a boss must rule, if at all.

The Germans are for many reasons easier to govern than the Irish. They are slower in thought and quieter in disposition, and they love to divert themselves in the company of their wives and children with music and plays, and they drink chiefly beer and light wines and coffee, which things tend to make them peaceable and averse to all kinds of broils and contests. Moreover they have long been accustomed through military service to obedience to rulers, and they are used to paying heavy taxes, and to be punished if they complain, so that they are submissive to whatever government is established, and do

not venture to think of overthrowing it. Furthermore, when they come to this country they find their burdens much diminished, for their taxes are lighter and they are freed from military service. Hence they naturally feel no discontent with a government which is easier to bear than that from which they have escaped, and they do not care to trouble themselves about it.

With the Irish it is altogether different; for they are of the Celtic race, which is the same in its character as when Julius Cæsar wrote of it. Now, as then, factions everywhere prevail among them, and they are devoted to the chiefs or leaders of these factions, expecting to be protected and supported by them. They are still, as in Cæsar's time, eager to participate in governing, fickle and changeable in their counsels. And in their diversions they desire not the company of their wives and children, since they chiefly enjoy fighting and contention of all kinds, and if they cannot take part themselves in what, in their speech, they call rows and shindies and ructions, they love to look at them, and to attend such sports as prize-fights and cock-fights and dog-fights, or even horse-races and

games of ball, if they can do no better. But they despise such diversions as the Germans love—listening to players upon musical instruments and the like—and they drink from preference distilled liquors. This they do partly because their native country produces no fruits from which wine may be made, and partly because they love the strength of such liquors; for the climate of Ireland is wet and cold, producing desire for drink that heats the blood. There is another reason also; for they have always hated the English and all their laws, and, because the English have forbidden them to make their own liquors, they have all the more made them in secret. Therefore their drink is generally whisky; for it is possible to conceal a whisky-still, but not a brewery, by reason of the small strength and great bulk of beer. Hence they are always turbulent; for they are easily excited even when sober, and when, as often happens, they are overcome with drink, they are apt to be violent and ferocious.

For this people adversity seems to be better than prosperity. In their own country they are not very intemperate; for, although they love liquor, by reason of their poverty

they are generally unable to get it. But when they come hither and find themselves suddenly rich, according to their standard, many of them become drunken, never having known how to get any pleasure from money except in spending it for drink. And at home they are merry and full of wit and frequently pleasant and courteous in their speech; this is partly because they have learned servility through long oppression, although only their manners and not their hearts have been subdued; but partly also because they are grateful to those who treat them kindly and generously, and when they give their affection they give it without reserve. But here they soon cease to be distinguished for their wit, and many of them become brutish in their manners and insolent to all whom they do not fear.

For they are told that in this country all men are equal, which, being ignorant of political matters, they interpret to mean equal in all respects. Wherefore, when they find themselves treated as befits their barbarous condition, they are aggrieved, and believe that they are deprived of what is their due. Moreover, since in their own land they have had no

places for diversion or entertainment except taverns and dram-shops, they continue to resort to such places here. But it is the fashion among our people to speak evil of these resorts and of those who keep them and of those who frequent them, and the Irish, not understanding this, think themselves disliked without reason, or because they are of a different race and religion. From all these causes it comes to pass that the Irish are generally detested by the other inhabitants of this country, whether rightly or wrongly; and they are therefore suspicious and resentful, and act together in a clannish way, as those do who think that every man's hand is against them. Furthermore, because they have ever looked upon their English rulers as enemies, they have a tendency to hate all government, as signifying oppression. Therefore they are not submissive as the Germans are; who, indeed, have been oppressed by rulers of their own race, but the Irish by foreigners. But whatever the cause may be, whether the natural sturdiness of the race or something else, they have submitted to the English only upon compulsion, and have always rebelled whenever there was opportunity.

It might seem that such a race would be equally difficult for a boss either to rule over or to rule with, and it would probably be so for a boss not of their own race. But these people have a strong feeling of devotion and loyalty to one another, which has been strengthened by persecution. Although they fight among themselves, yet that is because they love fighting and have none else to fight with; but if any one from outside interfere they will cease belaboring one another and all attack him. Hence any one whom they look upon as properly their ruler, whether of the laity or the clergy, they will support with the greatest loyalty; and so long as he takes their part against those who would oppress them, he may oppress them himself as much as he pleases. For all these reasons a boss who will favor them and their religion, especially if he is of their race, may count upon their loyalty if he will lead them properly. Hence, in spite of the name they have of being rebellious, they are better supporters of a boss than the Germans, even if the latter are more numerous; for they will submit to be ruled by the Irish, but the Irish will not submit to be ruled by them.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF THE RELIGION OF A BOSS.

MANY persons who are conversant with political affairs say that a boss has nothing to do with religion; but in saying this they are clearly mistaken. For among the ancients many rulers who were distinguished for their crimes were also distinguished for their reverence for the gods, and in this way they prevented the people from becoming disaffected. And in modern times not a few men have gained great riches by all manner of frauds and iniquities, and yet they have been at the same time careful in their religious observances, and have won great praise by liberality in their public benefactions. Accordingly, if a boss requires to rule by dishonest and corrupt means, it is all the more important for him to win the favor of the religious, and to prevent them from arraying themselves against him.

It may be urged against me that it is not so important now as when Aristotle wrote that a ruler should, as he advises, appear to reverence the gods; for when he wrote there were thought to be many gods, but all the people of a city were of the same religion; whereas in a modern city there is thought to be but one God, but the religions are many. But this should not lead us to think that a boss ought to have no religion, but rather that he should choose that religion which will be most advantageous to him, and at the same time show some favor to the others. Since the religion of the Irish is the Roman or Papist religion, and since a boss must rule by means of this race, that should be the faith professed by him, at least in the city of New York. Indeed, if he professed a different religion from the Irish it is probable that he could not secure their allegiance; for they have been taught by their long servitude to hate all that do not hold with them. Moreover their priests have joined heartily with them in withstanding the oppression of the English, and have endured the greatest poverty and suffered the cruelest persecutions rather than desert them, so that there is no

people more devoted to their clergy or more willing to obey them.

A further reason why a boss should make this choice is because those who hold to the other religions do not believe that the Papists are eternally accursed, while the Papists teach that all others are accursed. Moreover many of the Germans and of the other races are Papists; but if any of the Irish are not Papists they are more hated than the English themselves. Nor will it be hard for a boss to avoid conflicts with those holding to the other religions, since they are generally not ruled by their clergy, thinking them ignorant of political affairs and unfitted to take part therein. But the greater part of the Papists are themselves unlettered and ignorant, and at the same time think their priests divinely inspired, so that they are easily led by them. But if the clergy of the other religions are discontented, a boss can generally quiet them by exempting their institutions from taxes, or making some of them charges upon the public revenues, or granting them similar favors. If he does this, they will not dare to conspire against him, for fear of losing their subsidies; and they cannot complain that the

revenues are corruptly obtained if they share in them: nor is it usual for men of any religion, and especially the clergy, to reject money given to their churches because it was obtained in an evil way by the givers.

For a long time it has been possible for the Boss of New York to count upon the support of the Romish clergy, by granting them all manner of favors and seeing to it that as many of the offices as possible should be given to adherents of their church; for as the people are led by the politicians, and the politicians by a boss, so the laity are led by their priests, and the priests by their bishop. This alliance has occasioned some expense to the boss, by diverting a part of his revenue to the purposes of the Roman church, and by causing him to yield occasionally in the matter of appointments desired by his own followers. But the cost has been none too great, for the alliance has been more necessary for him than for the clergy. They could maintain their power without him, although shorn of much revenue; but he could not maintain himself for any long time were the clergy to turn their people against him. It has therefore been the part of wisdom for the boss to treat

the Archbishop of New York with the greatest deference and not to refuse any of his requests, even though he seemed by so doing to admit another to a share in his power. Moreover the boss can in his turn demand preferment for such of the clergy as he favors, and can contrive that those who are well disposed toward him shall be advanced to the highest places in the church.

But from some cause which is not yet revealed this alliance has been recently threatened by the intervention of the Pope of Rome. Some maintain that his interference has been brought about because of the great number of Italians now dwelling in this country, who are necessarily ruled by the Irish clergy; for the popes, being always Italians, have naturally given the chief positions at their disposal to ecclesiastics of that race, and it has perhaps seemed to them that the time has come for the Italian clergy in this country to be placed at the head. Others say that the pope is jealous of the Archbishop of New York, as exercising too much power and enjoying too great emoluments through his alliance with the boss. Whatever the explanation may be, the fact is patent that the

pope now maintains an Italian as his legate in this country, and that this legate overrides the Irish bishops, to their extreme humiliation and discomfiture.

History furnishes many examples of conflicts between princes and popes ; but we shall look in vain for an instance where a struggle has taken place between a pope and a boss ; for they are both, in a sense, secret rulers, their authority not being established by law, and the only sanction for their commands being of a spiritual nature. Experience, therefore, does not enable us to predict what the outcome of such a struggle would be. Yet the pertinacity with which the popes always maintain their claims, and the enduring character of their power, contrasted with the constant dangers which threaten the rule of a boss, and the need which he is under of continually shifting his policy, make it clear that no boss should array himself against the pope unless his power depends upon it. It would be beyond question a great calamity to a boss were the chief clergy in this country to be Italians rather than Irish ; yet if the pope demands this, it is better for the boss to yield. He may to some extent lose his hold upon

the Irish people, but he ought easily to convince the pope that the great favors and revenues now enjoyed by the Roman clergy at the public expense would be imperiled by the overthrow of the dominion of bosses. The alliance with the Roman church should therefore be maintained by a boss, even if he must show favors to the Italian clergy rather than the Irish; but he should support the Irish clergy in their resistance to the new policy of the pope as long as possible, for he will never again have allies so faithful as these have been.

CHAPTER XV.

OF THE FOUNDATION UPON WHICH THE
POWER OF A BOSS MUST BE FIXED,
IF IT IS TO BE DURABLE.

THE importance of looking at things rather than names, in such an inquiry as this, has been already explained. Hence I shall make no excuse for repeating much that Machiavelli says of military establishments, and of the different kinds of troops, and of the duties of a prince relative to his military force. For the aim of Machiavelli was to show by what means it was necessary for a prince to maintain himself, and when he wrote there was no way in which this could be done except by arms; but it would be absurd to say that because a boss cannot make use of armed men he requires nothing that will effect the same result. This is so far from being true that he is all the more in need of disciplined forces because he is deprived of the use of arms,

and much that Machiavelli lays down concerning troops will be true of such forces. Thus, I repeat, it is well understood that a small body of well-disciplined troops will defeat a much larger force of troops that are ill-disciplined, even if they have the same arms; but it is not so well understood that a similar thing is true of political contests; yet such is the truth. Although it is the law that the greater number shall rule, yet nearly always a smaller number, voting under orders as one man, will prevail over the greater number; because the latter are divided in their counsels, and many of their votes merely offset one another by being cast for different men. Indeed, if this were not so, it would be nearly hopeless for a boss to attempt to rule, since there are probably always more citizens opposed to him than favoring him. His safety lies in their disunion and in the union of his own followers. Accordingly let us proceed to apply what Machiavelli says of military establishments to the forces of the boss.

He observes, in the first place, that troops which serve for the defense of a state are either national, foreign, or mixed. Those of the second class, whether they serve as auxil-

aries or as mercenaries, he declares to be useless and dangerous ; and the prince who relies upon such soldiers will never, in his opinion, be secure ; because they are always ambitious, disunited, unfaithful, and undisciplined. Brave amongst friends, but cowardly in the face of an enemy, they neither fear God nor keep faith with man ; so that the prince who employs them can only retard his fall by delaying to put their valor to the proof. In short, they plunder the state in time of peace as much as the enemy does in time of war. To place this matter in a clearer light, he says, it is to be observed that the commanders of these troops are either men of conduct or ability, or they are not. If they are, they cannot be trusted ; because their own elevation can only be obtained by oppressing either the prince who employs them or others against his will. If they are not, they must hasten the ruin of the state they serve so ill. He adds that if he is told that every other commander will act in the same manner, his answer is that every war is carried on either by a prince or a republic, and that a prince ought to put himself at the head of his armies.

We need not concern ourselves with what Machiavelli has to say of the conduct of wars by republics, but his last observation is a maxim for the boss even more than for the prince. And, if we look at it narrowly, it explains all that he has said before; for all his objections to the employment of mercenaries arise from their having their own commanders. It is on this account that they are worthless and treacherous to the prince. If they were accustomed to obey him, and he were in the habit of punishing them for insubordination and mutiny, it would matter little where they were born; and so the English find it now in the East Indies, where they hold great bodies of excellent troops in the best of discipline by putting over them only English officers; whereby a few thousands rule quietly over many millions.

Moreover, if we examine Machiavelli's objections to the use of auxiliaries, they all reduce to the same thing. He says that this kind of military force may perhaps be useful to the state by which it is provided, but is always injurious to the prince by whom it is employed. For when defeated, the prince suffers the usual consequences; and when

victorious, he lies at the mercy of such an army. He assigns as the cause of this, among other things, that the auxiliary force is not under the command of the prince; but he needed not to mention the other causes, for this cause is sufficient of itself. If we study all the examples that he adduces, we see that they all teach the same lesson: that the prince who would successfully employ an armed force must command it, and make it entirely dependent upon himself. If he allows it to have commanders of its own, it will obey these commanders as willingly when they turn against the prince as when they fight for him. The best troops are those which obey whatever orders they receive without hesitation or inquiry, and provided orders come to them from the accustomed sources they do not pause to ask for what end they are given.

But if Machiavelli wrote concerning mercenaries with less wisdom than usual, it was because he was greatly distressed by the condition of Italy at that time. Through the use of mercenary troops by the ecclesiastical princes, who were strangers to the art of war, Italy came to be invaded by Charles VIII, ravaged and plundered by Louis XII, op-

pressed by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Swiss. Yet, since the invaders employed mercenaries, it would seem that the deplorable state of Italy was due chiefly to the fierce hatreds of the different states, which led them to prefer subjection to foreign rule rather than to that of their own countrymen.

The application of all this to the case of a boss is very plain. A boss must himself command the force by which his power is maintained, and make every member of that force understand that he is entirely dependent upon one single leader. It is true that a boss must commit the immediate discipline of his force to subordinate officers; but he must never allow these officers to think themselves the real commanders, or permit their troops to look upon them as such. If he allows this, all the evils of mercenary and auxiliary troops described by Machiavelli will at once arise, and a boss who is incapable of exercising this authority will soon be displaced by some of the leaders whom he has allowed to grow too powerful. He may flourish for a time, but if he does not apprehend evils till it is too late to prevent them, he cannot be truly called a wise man; yet such foresight is bestowed upon few.

From his reasonings and examples, Machiavelli draws the conclusion that a prince ought to make the art of war his occupation, for it is peculiarly the science of those who govern. War, he says, and the several sorts of discipline and institutions relating to it, should be the prince's only study, the only profession he should follow, and the object he ought always to have in view. By this means princes can maintain possession of their dominions, and private individuals are sometimes raised thereby to supreme authority; while, on the other hand, we frequently see princes shamefully reduced to nothing by suffering themselves to be enfeebled by slothful inactivity. By a neglect of this art, he repeats, states are lost, and by cultivating it they are acquired.

But if this is true of a prince, whose rule is comparatively easy, how much more is it true of a boss, who is at every moment of his career exposed to the malignant attacks of envious and disappointed men, and who can have no adherents except among those who believe that he is capable of maintaining himself! If he does not display this capacity, his downfall will infallibly be sudden and complete;

and he can only attain this capacity by making the art of handling his forces — which is in modern times, for a boss, the same thing as the art of war for a prince when Machiavelli wrote — his sole study and occupation. This art is now commonly called the art of practical politics, and by neglecting it bosses lose their power, and by cultivating it they maintain it. This is what is meant by Aristotle when he so earnestly exhorts the tyrant to take good care of only one thing, namely, the power, that not only the willing but the unwilling also shall submit to it; for if he once lose this, his tyranny is at an end. And he expressly says that if a tyrant will not study to acquire any other virtue, yet he ought to aim at political ability. Accordingly, to sum up the whole matter, I maintain that a boss should labor night and day to perfect himself in the art of practical politics, in order that he may maintain his forces in the highest state of efficiency and discipline; or, in the speech of modern times, that he should develop and perfect a political organization, which is commonly called also simply an organization or machine.

CHAPTER XVI.

OF THE ORGANIZATION OF A POLITICAL FORCE OR MACHINE.

HAVING shown that a boss must maintain himself by means of a disciplined force, I have now to explain the methods to be observed in organizing such a body. Before doing so, however, it will be advantageous to restate the general principles already established for the conduct of a boss of the city of New York. In the first place, it appeared that, since the public are divided into two parties, he is to rule by one of them, which is at present the Democratic party, because it is the most numerous. And within this party it is necessary to rule by means of the politicians, for they alone can be held in subjection. It is desirable, also, to secure the alliance of the Roman church, or at least not to arouse its hostility. And the chief reliance must be

upon the Irish race, as being not only most loyal to leaders of its own religion and blood, and therefore amenable to discipline, but also as being naturally fond of strife, and hence not slothful or indifferent. The other races are, indeed, not to be neglected or maltreated ; but as the same reliance cannot be placed upon them, they cannot be made use of to the same extent. Such are the general principles to be observed.

To take up the particular rules, I maintain that a boss should see that his force is constituted of a large number of small companies, each company being drawn from a certain region and led by a captain of its own. Herein the organization of a machine differs essentially from that of an army ; for an army is made up, it is true, of companies, but these companies are united into regiments, and these into brigades, and so on. This is required by the nature of military affairs where many bodies of men are to be moved in different places in order to be concentrated at a particular moment in one spot. Besides, when an action is brought on, it often becomes necessary to change all prearranged plans at a moment's notice, which can be

accomplished only when the commander has able generals under him. But in a political contest there is no concentration of forces, nor is there any general action, but a great number of petty ones, each in its own locality; the aim being to cast the greatest number of votes in as many of those places as possible. But since these votes are to be cast for candidates determined in advance, when the decisive day of election has come it is impossible to change the orders. The policy adopted may prove to be mistaken, but it is then too late to alter it. Concerning this a boss is at liberty to consult his captains as much as he thinks desirable, and he is fortunate if he has wise counselors; but he will secure them at too great a sacrifice if he allows them to become so powerful as to control his decisions.

Upon this account I do not hesitate to say that a boss should as far as possible avoid the employment of generals, and should allow those whom he is obliged to employ very limited powers. The necessity of this arises from his extreme liability to be overthrown by treachery and mutiny. The commander of an army is less exposed to this danger,

because he has the power to put to death at once or to imprison any one, whether general officer or private soldier, that does not render him prompt obedience. Yet even the most absolute commander frequently does not dare to punish a general whom he knows to be unfaithful, fearing the revenge of the soldiers who have been accustomed to obey him ; and if he is determined to punish such a one, he first removes him from his command. Not many commanders have been more absolute than Napoleon ; but he was put to the greatest anxiety by the jealousies of his marshals, and some writers claim that he was finally ruined because these men had come to think themselves so great that they would not faithfully carry out the orders of their chief unless they thought fit.

But a boss can neither put to death nor imprison his subordinates, and he is not always able to deprive a rebellious officer of his position, or at least not at once. Hence I maintain that a boss should take care that none of his officers becomes very powerful, and, therefore, if he must have generals, he should be constantly on the watch to learn whether those under their command are disposed to

obey them or him, and to see if any of these generals is trying to win over the others to support him. It is evident enough that the captain of a few hundred voters can never be dangerous to a boss, so long as he is directly under his command and has no dependency upon any other officer. It is equally evident that a general who has under him a number of captains who have nothing to do with the supreme commander may become a dangerous rival to the latter. Hence, if it is possible for a boss to make all the captains directly responsible to him and to no one else, it is certainly advantageous. I know that a different custom prevails in the city of New York, and, as is always the case, many will be found to say that existing customs are best, or at least that they cannot be altered. If they say what is true, it behooves every boss of New York to watch the conduct of his generals with the utmost jealousy, for he is sure to be sooner or later undone by them.

But I do not admit that what they say is true; for if we refer to what Aristotle and Machiavelli have advised, we find them both laying it down that tyrants and princes must take care that no citizen attains any high de-

gree of power. Thus Aristotle quotes from Herodotus with approbation the story of the conduct of Periander when Thrasybulus sent a messenger to him asking for advice as to how he should rule. For Periander said nothing to the messenger, but walked with him in his garden, and, as he walked, struck off the heads of the tallest flowers; signifying that a tyrant must, from time to time, make way with the most eminent citizens. And Aristotle declares again that a tyranny must be preserved by keeping down those that rise too high, and removing those that are of an aspiring disposition.

Machiavelli also frequently commends this policy in princes, and in commenting upon the conquest of Asia by Alexander he observes that all monarchies of which there are any records left in history have been governed either by an absolute prince, to whom all the rest are slaves, and whose ministers, by his favor and consent, assist in governing the kingdom; or else they have been ruled by a prince and nobles who claim a share in the government not so much through the prince's favor as from the antiquity and nobility of their blood. Such nobles also possess states

and subjects of their own, who acknowledge them as their lords and entertain a particular affection toward them. In a country governed by a prince and ministers of his own appointment, the sovereign enjoys infinitely the greatest authority, because throughout the whole kingdom no authority is acknowledged but his ; and if any obeys another it is only as a minister or official for whom no particular affection is felt.

Thus, Machiavelli said, the Turkish monarchy is governed by an absolute ruler, who divides his kingdom into different provinces ruled by different governors whom he changes and recalls at pleasure. Such a state is difficult to attack, because the invader cannot be called in by the nobles of the kingdom, nor can he reckon on the assistance and rebellion of those who surround the prince. The officers of such a state being his slaves and dependents, it becomes more difficult to corrupt them ; and, supposing it were possible, little assistance is to be had from them, since they are unable to draw the people along with them, for the reasons before adduced. Although Machiavelli wrote long ago, time has only made his wisdom more manifest ; for the

Turkish monarchy still endures, and whatever losses it has suffered have been due principally to a disregard of the principle which Machiavelli explained, as in the case of Mehemet Ali of Egypt, and the Hospodars of the Danubian provinces.

From all this it seems to be beyond question that the despotic ruler, whether he be called tyrant, or prince, or boss, must cause it to be understood that all preferment comes only from him, and continues only at his pleasure. To prevent those to whom he commits the charge of affairs from forming a different opinion, he must see to it that they have no ground for believing that they obtain office through the personal support of their followers. I admit that it may be impracticable to select generals or leaders from among those that have no followers; but what I maintain is that if the generals think they owe their places to their followers and not to the boss, they will be arrogant and insubordinate, and constantly ready to mutiny. On the other hand, if they are satisfied that their following is not sufficient to put them in office and to maintain them there, they will be submissive and devoted to the ruler who has

given them what they had not power to take by themselves.

Hence, I repeat, a boss should, so far as practicable, rule directly through the captains of the small districts and not through intermediate officers; for these will almost of necessity be puffed up by their directing numbers of inferiors, and will gradually come to feel that these subordinates obey them and not the boss; and the subalterns, knowing only these superior officers, will have the same feeling. Hence there will be produced an army with such gradations that it may be commanded by one person as well as another, and in such a case the power of the boss can be but temporary. Whereas if he will take such generals as he must have from among the captains of the districts, they will understand that they owe their preferment directly to his favor and to their devotion to his interests; and not to the demands of their own followers.

This is the lesson taught by the history of the later Roman emperors. After Sejanus had united the prætorian guards into one compact body, the prætorian prefect became the most powerful man in the Roman state,

making whomsoever he pleased emperor, and presently dethroning him. It is true that power received upon these terms may be preserved for a while by submission on the part of the ruler to those who are in name his subjects—if indeed this may be called power; but, as Machiavelli shows, it is hard to please such masters without discontenting the people. For when an army is controlled by officers of this kind, the soldiers will be rapacious and insolent, and they will constantly endeavor to satiate their avarice and cruelty at the expense of the subjects.

In this they cannot be restrained: their own generals will not do so, for fear of losing their popularity; and the commander cannot, for the soldiers do not receive their orders from him, and he dares not issue such orders to the generals, for fear of their refusing to execute them. If he attempts this, as Machiavelli shows to have happened in the case of many of the emperors, he will probably fall a victim to their hatred; for, as he says, hatred is as easily incurred by good actions as by evil, and hence a prince is often compelled to be wicked in order to maintain his power. For when the strongest party is cor-



rupt (whether it be the people, the nobles, or the troops), he must comply with their disposition, and content them, and from that moment he must renounce doing good, or it will prove his ruin.

This Machiavelli says as showing the necessity laid upon those emperors who were raised by the prætorian guards to yield to them; for if one has to choose between exciting the hatred of the stronger or the weaker party, it is better to take part with the stronger. But if the guards had not been united under their own generals, the emperors could have held them down and restrained their excesses. There should be no occasion to resort to such perilous remedies as those used by Hiero of Syracuse, who had all his mercenaries slaughtered, and by Mahmoud, the Turkish emperor, who massacred the greater part of his Janizaries. Since a boss can now employ no such effective measures as these, let him take care to avoid situations where they would be desirable, by preventing the rise of powerful subordinates. In every one of his chief officers let him constantly see an envious and malignant rival, who can be made harmless only by being kept powerless, and in all of



them together a band of conspirators who are restrained from overthrowing him only by their distrust and jealousy of one another.

In selecting his subordinates, therefore, a boss will do wisely to follow the counsel of Machiavelli, who declares that there is one infallible rule whereby a prince may know his ministers, viz., to observe whether they attend more to their own interest than to that of the state. A minister should be entirely devoted to the public service, and should never address the prince on his private affairs. It is the part of a boss, therefore, to attend to the interest of a faithful minister, and to heap honors, riches, fortune, and other favors upon him, that so he may be satisfied in his station, and have no reason to desire a change; in fine, that he may dread, and endeavor with all his power to prevent, any fatal reverse which may threaten his master. Whether these rules have been observed or not in the government of the city of New York, I do not now consider; especially since the matter is open to the observation of all.

CHAPTER XVII.
OF THE MOTIVE AND ANIMATING PRINCIPLE OF A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
OR MACHINE.

IF we examine the history of the great armies that have won success in the past, with a view to ascertaining the motives that have led so many human beings to devote themselves to probable death, and to undergo certainly the greatest hardships, we shall find that in most cases, where the success of an army has been permanent, the soldiers have been animated with love for their commander. It is true that glorious feats were performed by the armies of the Lacedæmonians and the early Romans and those of some other peoples, merely from their sense of duty; but these were armies of citizens serving in the defense of their own families and homes and possessions. But the armies of Alexander and of Hannibal and of Julius Cæsar and of

Napoleon were not citizen armies defending their own country, but were generally engaged in conquest. Hence the motive of the soldiers could not have been patriotism, but must have been something else; and in all these cases the soldiers were devoted to their commanders. But this devotion was not so much the cause of their success as their success was the cause of their devotion; for they would not have loved these generals had they been unsuccessful. But the success obtained by soldiers is desired by them partly because it is a delight for men to triumph in contests of every kind with their fellows, and odious to be beaten, and partly because success enables them to satisfy their desires with the goods of the defeated, and frees them from the fear of losing their own. No one can doubt that the former of these motives is to many men more powerful than the latter; for they frequently perform actions that are dangerous for the sake of glory, although such actions bring them no profit. But the greater number would probably prefer profitable actions that were inglorious, or at least would not be content with winning victories that were barren of profit.

I have already shown that we must not believe that there is no likeness between the force of a boss and the army of a prince because arms are no longer employed. Hence it is reasonable to suppose that in the main the boss must appeal to the same motives in his followers as are appealed to by the prince in the case of his soldiers. In other words, if a boss is to maintain himself, he must win success for his forces, that they may be both lifted up by the consciousness that they can defeat their adversaries, and comforted with substantial spoils. Now so far as glory is concerned, the boss need not greatly trouble himself ; for, being immaterial, it can be easily divided. There is no limitation as to its quantity, and all may share in it. But in the case of the spoils, as I have said before, there is sure to be much heart-burning, and, being material and therefore limited in quantity, there is never such an abundance as to satisfy all. This difficulty, however, does not appear to be much greater in the case of a boss than in the case of the general of an army ; and if it has been overcome by generals who have yet retained the loyalty of their troops, it may also be overcome by a boss.

Moreover in the case of his forces the negative motive, fear of loss, is of great influence ; for soldiers immediately dissipate their spoils in riotous living, but the spoils distributed by a boss are in the shape of offices to which salaries are attached, and thus have permanence. Accordingly, whenever any man obtains an office, he is not alone concerned lest he lose it, but his parents also, and frequently his brothers and sisters and cousins, and also the parents and kin of his wife, especially among the Irish, because of their clannishness. For all these consider that if the profits of that office are lost by their relative, he will no longer be able to do them favors by his influence with other officers, and moreover will probably have to be supported by them, and his family likewise ; for most of those that have held political offices are not thought desirable servants by private employers.

Thus it frequently happens that if one man receives an office there are ten voters who are interested in having him keep it ; and therefore if the offices in the city of New York are wisely distributed, it is possible to secure the fidelity of a very great number, if not a majority, of the citizens. In

the case of the army, every soldier must be paid and have his share of the spoils ; but in the case of the organization controlled by the boss, if a certain number are paid with offices most of the remainder may be held in submission. For they are not without hope that after a time some of the spoils may be awarded to them, and, as appears from the conduct of those who buy chances in lotteries, as well as in the case of soldiers, men are always hopeful beyond reason.

Hence, although it might seem at first incredible that the greater number of the citizens should be governed in their voting by the expectation of being maintained at the expense of the remainder, this is no more unreasonable than that men should spend their money in gambling, concerning which it is even true that the more they lose the more confident they become of winning. So that it is by no means necessary that the organization should comprehend a majority of the citizens ; for, in the first place, probably one fourth of the citizens never vote at all, and many of them will vote always with whatever organization bears the name of the national party to which they are attached ; and great

numbers will vote with the organization which will make the best provision for their relatives, as we have just seen. Moreover the opposition are seldom united, and whenever there is any prospect of their combining against the government of a boss, the leaders of the other party will try to make it a combination in their own favor.

Furthermore it is generally possible to make a secret treaty with these leaders, whereby they shall, while seeming to be hostile to a boss, be really causing their followers to cast their votes as he wishes. Such treaties can almost always be effected by the promise of a certain share in the spoils. There are also many profitable contracts to be awarded as a boss wills. So that it sufficiently appears that the motive and animating principle of the machine or organization of a boss is the expectation of office or of profit to be somehow made at the expense of the public, either for one's self or for one's friends and relatives; or, what is much the same, the fear of losing some office or profit already obtained. If a boss can contrive to maintain these hopes and expectations without excessive disappointment, he may continue with even more

prosperity than the great generals whom I have named, for he is less exposed to external attack; but like them he must instantly suppress all signs of mutiny with the greatest severity.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF THE REVENUE DERIVED FROM THE CITIZENS AND HOW FAR IT MAY BE APPROPRIATED BY A BOSS.

THE revenue collected from the citizens of New York, which is at the disposal of a boss, is of two kinds. There is first the revenue that is raised openly and by authority of law, nearly all of which is derived from taxes, from assessments, from rents, and from fees and licenses. The peculiarity of this revenue is that it is required by law to be accounted for to the public, and must appear of record, so that those who collect it must pay it over only upon proper vouchers and warrants.

The second kind of revenue has secret sources, and it is impossible and would be dangerous to keep any account or record of it, for fear of its being disclosed. This rev-

enue consists, first, of what is paid to secure the assessment of property at a low rate, or its omission from the rolls, and which is therefore a payment for exemption from taxation. Secondly, it consists of the contributions of those who may be put to expense by hostile legislation, and who pay to prevent it, and of those who pay to secure favorable legislation or advantages in rents or contracts; either money being contributed, or shares of stock, or sometimes knowledge concerning coming changes in the prices of stocks, or concerning new enterprises and improvements whereby the values of particular properties may be affected. Thirdly, payments may be exacted from those who desire to secure immunity for their violation of laws, or to secure protection against many sorts of molestation, and also to cause the persecution of enemies or rivals in business. There are certain other sources of revenue, but these are the principal ones.

The expenditure of the revenues that are raised openly is for the most part regulated by law, and consists almost wholly in payments for services and for materials. The quantity of materials purchased for the city

of New York, in order to supply the schools and hospitals and prisons and the various offices, and for many other purposes, is very great ; consisting of food and clothing, horses and machinery, and numberless other things. These purchases are made by the city officers, partly of such persons and upon such terms as they choose, and partly, after advertisement of what is required, of those who offer to furnish the materials at the lowest prices. But the difference is not very material, since it is generally possible, when it is determined that a certain person shall receive a contract, so to contrive the forms and specifications that he alone can bid successfully. And if this cannot always be done, yet so much trouble may be caused to contractors who insist upon obtaining these contracts, by rejecting their work as not conforming to the terms specified, or by withholding their pay, that they are soon discouraged and withdraw from competition. As to the payments for services, they consist almost entirely of salaries and wages, which are fixed by law or by the city ordinances. The total amount of these is very large, and the rates vary extremely, some officers receiving a hundred

times as much as others ; and frequently those receiving the highest pay perform the least service.

In general it may be said, concerning the collection as well as the spending of the taxes, that a boss should pay attention to the advice of Aristotle, and seem to keep an exact account both of what is received and of what is paid, taking particular care that he appear to collect and keep them, not as his own property, but as that of the people ; nor need he ever fear that he shall lack money while he have the supreme power in his hands. In the case of salaries it is generally necessary that they be fully paid, not merely because they are paid by draft, but chiefly because they are paid so frequently and to such great numbers that if any less should be paid than is due there could be no concealment of it. But in paying contractors and in the purchase of materials, the amounts vary, and the times of payment are irregular, and the number of persons concerned is few, so that there is more opportunity for securing commissions and deductions.

Nor is it very material, according to the opinion of some, that all such expenditures

are made matter of public record, for few persons examine these records, or could understand them if they did. This seemed to be proved clearly by Boss Tweed; for when great complaints were made that the city was being defrauded in its contracts, he invited a number of citizens, distinguished for their integrity and thought to be wise in matters of business, to examine the accounts. This they accordingly did, but he was able to deceive them so completely that they reported the debt of the city as being twenty millions of dollars less than it was in truth, and they further certified that the financial affairs of the city were administered in a correct and faithful manner. Nevertheless it was by means of the records that Boss Tweed was undone; for some unfaithful clerk discovered their falsity, and procured evidence of it which was published abroad. Peradventure this boss might even then have maintained himself had he claimed to be ignorant of the frauds, and thrown the blame upon his officers; but instead of doing so he openly confessed that he had used the taxes as his own property, and defied the people, which no boss can safely do in modern days. Accord-

ingly it seems most judicious to have the receipts and expenditures truly recorded, since otherwise it is possible that there may be detection and exposure, which will stir up the citizens to rebel. A wise boss will guard not only against what will probably occur, but also against what seems unlikely, if it may cause his ruin ; having in mind the proverb, "It is the unexpected that happens."

Such being the principal sources of revenue that exist in the city of New York, and the general purposes for which it is expended, so far as the expenditure is prescribed by law, it remains to inquire more particularly concerning the manner in which a boss shall appropriate so much of this revenue as he requires. Since, as we have seen, he cannot without great peril take money directly from what I have called the open or legal sources, his income must be derived either indirectly from these sources, or else come wholly from the secret revenues. As to these latter, it is beyond question that they are very great, and some of them may safely be appropriated by a boss. Thus it frequently happens that rich men desire to carry on some great work that is not only for their own profit but also for

the common good, but are deterred by the clamor of the writers for the press, who find favor with the populace, or think they do, by affecting to be concerned for their welfare, and by denouncing the rich as caring nothing for justice and as governed wholly by avarice and greed. But if the work be desirable, it is wise and safe for a boss to pay no regard to the venal yelping of these wretches, for the opinions of the weightier and more intelligent of the citizens are no more influenced by it than the course of the moon by the baying of hounds.

A boss may therefore with propriety encourage men of wealth and power to carry out improvements, by signifying to his followers that he desires no opposition. In this way he becomes entitled to share in the profits of the work, and justly, for without him the folly of the people would have prevented it altogether, as happened in the time of Commodore Vanderbilt. For he was disposed, and he had both the power and the opportunity, to provide such means of quick travel as were needed by the people of the city; but he was so reviled by the writers for the press, or journalists as they are called, whom the people

only applauded, that he became wroth, and cursed both the people and the writers, and declared that they might travel after such manner as they could, for he would do nothing for so vile a crew. No greater triumph was ever won by scurrility posing as virtue; for the people of the city are to this day suffering from the evils brought upon them through their tolerating the licentiousness of their journalists in this instance, nor is it yet certain that they will ever get the means of quick travel which they might have been enjoying for many years.

By rendering such assistance to rich and powerful men, a boss acquires a claim to their gratitude, and may reasonably ask to be informed of great enterprises at their very inception, and to be allowed to participate in them, whereby he may be enabled to take advantage of changes in values, either of land or of other forms of property. In like manner he may be compensated for checking legislation intended to damage men of wealth and the enterprises in which they are engaged, and also for communicating information as to what will be his course in all these matters. He may also share in the payments

made by those who desire to violate laws without being punished; and there are certain other ways of secretly obtaining revenue.

I am far from saying that there is no danger attending the receipt of revenues of this kind by a boss; but the sums to be obtained are very great, and moreover a boss has no other resources whereby he can maintain himself. The dangers must therefore be faced; but it is important to understand their nature in order to be prepared to guard against them. The chief danger comes from the followers of the boss, for it is apparent that in many things he is obliged to act through them. Accordingly, when he directs them either to enact some law favorable to an enterprise, or to arrest legislation unfavorable to particular interests, they will at once understand that he will be paid for what they do, and, unless they are very well disciplined, or in some way made content, they will complain and will be disposed to revolt against him. On the other hand, if he allows them to receive pay for reducing assessments, or for procuring charters, or for withdrawing proposed laws, or for having the city make purchases of their favorites, or for arranging to let them obtain contracts,

the greatest possible evils will follow. The very least of these will be that the boss will receive but a small part of this revenue, while his followers will keep the most of it. This they can do, since the amount of it cannot be known, and they will represent it to be less than it really is, in order that they may surrender as little as possible.

A greater evil is that, as there is no system in such tolls and exactions and commissions when levied by a great number of persons, they are after a time raised to such an extent as to be intolerable, and the people first groan under them and then rebel. For many persons come to them and obtain money for such purposes as I have described, when they really have no power to do anything in return for what is paid. This is called levying blackmail, and those who pay it feel that they have been robbed, and yet they dare not complain for fear of exposing their own corruption. The evil thus spreads throughout the whole government of the city, and affects so many that their discontent presently breaks all bounds, and the boss is overwhelmed in the ruin of the followers whose insolence he was too weak or too indolent to restrain.

As to the folly on the part of a boss of allowing his followers to become arrogant and to feel that they are able to maintain themselves without his aid, I have already said enough, and there is nothing to be added to the maxims of Aristotle. Therefore I do not hesitate to declare that he will not very long remain a boss who allows his followers to plunder the citizens at their will, and to keep the spoil for themselves; for the citizens will believe that the spoil goes to the boss, and will be inflamed against him for his rapacity. In this way he will suffer the consequences of the misdeeds of others without receiving any profit from them, and will lose both fame and fortune.

It may perhaps be objected that it will be impossible for a boss to rule unless he allows his followers to levy blackmail; for otherwise he will be unable to remunerate them with sufficient liberality to make them faithful. I do not deny that the matter is one of great difficulty, but it can never be admitted that a boss is necessarily obliged to rule in such a manner as to insure his own destruction. If this were so, not only would this treatise be futile, but most of what Aristotle and Ma-

chiavelli wrote concerning tyrants and princes must be rejected. Since we know that many tyrants and princes have prospered, and as it is apparent that they could not have prospered had they held their followers in no restraint, we may conclude that there is no impossibility, whatever may be the difficulty, in establishing upon a firm basis the rule of a boss in the city of New York.

The impossibility imagined to exist has arisen from the disregard of the principles already laid down concerning the discipline of the organization or machine. Owing to this disregard, certain leaders have grown so powerful as to be able to insist upon indemnity for the acts of their dependents in levying blackmail, and have undoubtedly appropriated to themselves a great amount of plunder, and secretly, if not openly, defy the boss to control their action. Unless these leaders are reduced they will certainly overthrow the boss, and they are only prevented from attempting this by the fear of overthrowing themselves.

I contend, therefore, that the proper system for raising revenue requires that the petty exactions of the followers of the boss should

be suppressed, and that, so far as is possible, all payments of secret or illegal revenue of the kinds that I have described should be directly controlled and regulated by him alone. To a great extent he should receive them himself, with the greatest secrecy, without written evidence, and never in the presence of more than one person besides himself, whether that person be his own confidential agent or the representative of those who bargain with him; and it is also desirable that the transaction should be spoken of, even when consummated, as something different from what it really is.

This principle, however, can be applied only when a few persons and a few great interests are involved. Where a great number desire to violate the laws, as happens in the case of the sellers of drink, it is not only impracticable, but also undignified, and even dangerous, for a boss to conduct the negotiations in person, and resort must be had to methods that require the most careful consideration, to which I shall now proceed.

CHAPTER XIX.

OF THE REVENUE FROM POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS.

IT may be thought that a boss who regarded the principles laid down in the last chapter would find his income and power diminished rather than increased; for he must rule by the aid of the politicians, and I have shown that they must be deprived of the opportunity to levy contributions for themselves. To this I reply that it is not only unwise to allow any of them to receive large sums in this way, but also unnecessary. It is unwise for the reason already given, because if they are able to enrich themselves by plundering the people after this fashion, they are sure to become insolent and mutinous. It is unnecessary, because it is entirely possible for a boss to make such provision in other ways for his followers as will keep them devoted to his interest. They may be at first discon-

tented, but when they find that they must choose between receiving such pay as the boss allows them, and having nothing at all, they will presently yield.

In this the overwhelming advantages to a boss of having a well-disciplined organization become apparent; for it is possible to collect a very great revenue in the form of contributions to his organization, and a boss may retain out of this an ample sum for his own use, and still leave sufficient for the maintenance of his forces. Moreover there is nothing illegal in such contributions, since it is impossible to forbid citizens to give money for the expenses attendant upon elections, and it is no less impossible to inquire effectively into the motives of their contributions, or into the disposition that is made of them. Hence a boss may require a faithful account to be kept for him of all that is received by the organization, while he is accountable to no one for its expenditure. Indeed should any of his followers presume to demand an account of a boss, no punishment can be too quick or too severe for him. Such a demand can have but one purpose, and, as nothing is more alarming than that any one should venture to

make it, a boss should instantly drop every other affair and devote his whole energy to crushing all those that have given the slightest countenance to the movement, and should even discipline those that have not actively opposed it ; letting it be known that he deems it high treason for any of his followers to assume to inquire into the amount of his revenue, or the manner in which it is procured.

These contributions to the machine have two main sources. They are paid either by those already possessing or expecting to obtain offices, or by those who desire or receive favors through the special action or inaction of the government. As to the first class, the fundamental principle is perfectly simple. The salaries of the offices of government should almost invariably be fixed at a higher rate than what would be paid for equal service by private employers. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of this principle, and so long as a boss can maintain it he may laugh at all the machinations of those who call themselves reformers of the civil service. For nothing is more certain than that when a higher price is to be paid for anything or any service than what it is currently worth,

there will be such a desire to obtain this additional profit as to multiply the competitors; and it is also evident that whoever desires to obtain a profit of this kind, which he has done nothing to deserve above others, is not of a character to stick at making some payment for it.

Some difficulty, it is true, may from time to time be occasioned by laws prohibiting such payments; but there are many ways in which such laws are evaded. It is therefore only necessary for a boss to leave in the possession of the holders of office such a part of their salaries as shall be somewhat more than their services are worth in the market, and all the rest he may require to be paid to the organization; for, although the office-holders will bewail their assessments, they will think it better to pay them, since even then they will receive more for their services than they could elsewhere obtain.

In order to comply with the laws, such payments must always be spoken of as voluntary; but if any one should choose not to pay what is customary, he must, upon some pretext or other, be deprived of his office as quickly as possible; nor, in spite of laws in-

tended to prevent this, will it be generally very difficult to bring it about, provided the fundamental principle above stated be observed. Those best fitted to judge estimate that the sums paid for service of all kinds by the government of the city of New York are not less than twofold what private employers would pay for the same or better service. Hence a revenue of several millions of dollars ought to be produced by a wise and equitable system of assessments, all of which should be strictly accounted for to the boss, and disbursed by him without rendering any account to any person. But he should be constantly upon his guard against attempts by his subordinates to increase these assessments secretly for their own use; for if this practice comes to prevail, the exactions will shortly be so great as to leave less to the office-holders than their services are really worth, and, like all overtaxed people, they will be ready to rebel. It will, moreover, strengthen a boss with the mass of his followers if they know that they can appeal successfully to him against the oppression of their immediate superiors.

A second principle is of almost equal im-

portance, viz., that the number of offices should be as great as possible. The policy of this is too evident to need explanation; for in this way both the forces and the revenue of a boss are increased, and, since the office-holders are taken from the citizens, the number of those who may be interested to overthrow him is diminished. The countries of France and Italy both show the operation of this policy. The taxes are so great in France that those who have property find it difficult to support the burden, and in Italy it has apparently become impossible; yet in neither case can the load be reduced, because this can be done only by reducing the number of office-holders. But their number is now so great that with the aid of their friends and dependents they can menace the government and defeat all attempts at saving in this way. Whatever change takes place in the parties, therefore, no reduction of expenditure follows. But of the application of this policy in the city of New York I shall speak more fully hereafter.

I have already given reasons why a boss should rule his force rather through a large number of officers, each commanding a small

number of men, than through a small number of generals, each commanding an army of his own. This policy should be consistently applied in the case of salaries. It will be far more advantageous to a boss to give places to fifty men at salaries of two thousand dollars each, than to give one man a place where he may receive a hundred thousand dollars, even though he may contribute a greater sum by way of assessment than the fifty. For there can be no question that an office of which the emoluments are so great has generally its own system of levying contributions, and has a great patronage, neither of which things is it for the interest of a boss to tolerate.

Let him therefore look to it that the emoluments of such offices are diminished, and that the appointments are not made by one man from his own followers, but are distributed throughout the city according to the number of faithful voters. It is a capital mistake for a boss to allow a man having a large personal following to hold such an office as that of the clerk, or the sheriff, or the register, or the commissioner of public works, or even to be a police or fire commissioner. For every such man is apt to think

that he may rise to be a boss, and will surround himself with those who are devoted to him. If such men are allowed to hold these offices at all, it must be upon their promise to appoint only such subordinates as are approved by the boss. In this way they will be weakened, for their followers will quickly lose faith in them. But it is better to keep such men out of those offices where there are many appointments to be made, or much patronage to distribute, and, if necessary, to give them places where the salaries are high but the appointments few ; or even to placate them with gifts of money from the revenue of the organization, or with desirable contracts. Such are the general rules to be followed concerning offices and salaries ; but of some exceptional cases, and of payments for favors received from government, it remains still to speak.

CHAPTER XX.

OF SOME THINGS THAT HINDER AND SOME THAT AID A BOSS IN SECURING REVENUE.

TO resume what I have just been saying, the aim of every boss should be to make all the holders of office feel their immediate dependence upon him, not only for their positions, but also for the amount of their salaries. The greatest obstacle encountered in bringing this about is the law, which fixes the terms of all important offices, and also the pay attached to them. The law may be evaded, however, if the boss can prevent those from getting office who will not promise beforehand to resign whenever he wishes it and to pay proper assessments. Yet this is only practicable with men who, after they have obtained a benefit, will do what they promised in order to obtain it, and such men

are few. Hence it is of the greatest importance to a boss that the term of office fixed by law should be as short as possible; for then those who get office will keep their promises, fearing that if they do not they will be presently displaced and reduced to poverty. In many cases, also, it is possible to require the payment of assessments in advance, especially where the power of a boss is so great that whosoever he permits to be nominated by the organization is certain to be elected.

So far as most of the offices in the city of New York are concerned, the term is sufficiently short; but an important exception is found in the case of the higher judges, whose term was made fourteen years, after the downfall of Boss Tweed, for the very purpose of thwarting all future bosses. Undoubtedly this has succeeded to a certain extent, for the boss has not always been able to prevent the election of judges who refused to obey his orders, thinking a term of fourteen years sufficient, and likely to be, indeed, longer than the reign of a boss. This mischief, however, has been fortunately reduced a good deal by means of the very great salaries received by

these judges. For if we consider the certainty of payment, and the short hours and the long vacations of the courts, and the honor and power of the position, these salaries are far beyond what the lawyers—except perhaps one in a hundred—can earn by the practice of their profession. Indeed one of the wisest of these judges declared that there was not one man upon the bench in the city of New York who could earn the amount of his salary if he were off it. Hence there is never any difficulty in finding men of sufficient ability for the places who are ready, for the sake of winning such rich prizes, to make the promises required by the boss.

Thus the event is happy; for if the salaries of the judges were one half what they now are, a boss could not find men of sufficient ability to discharge the duties of the office, who would pay assessments or make any promises, and he would thus altogether lose control of the judiciary, which might be fatal to his power. But it is evident that men who will pay assessments for the sake of obtaining these positions are not of a character to be dreaded by a boss; for if they yield to one temptation they will to another. Yet,

after having paid their assessments in advance, and being firmly established in office, they may assume too great independence, and it is accordingly desirable that the most servile characters be selected, and that the promises they make to secure their places shall be written or witnessed, so that they can be publicly proved against them. If this is done the fear of exposure will render them tractable. Even with this precaution trouble will arise from time to time, and it is a fortunate thing for the boss that there are few offices whereof the term is so long. As to the lower judges, there has never been any difficulty encountered by him in keeping them in perfect subjection, since he can name them himself.

Regarding the other principal offices, there is little to be added to the advice of Aristotle, who remarks that it is wise not to make one person too great, but if any, then more than one; for they will act as guards upon one another. But if it is necessary to intrust large powers to one person, then a boss should take care that he be not one of an ardent disposition; for such a temperament is upon every opportunity readiest to rebel. And if it should seem necessary to deprive any one

of his power, it is well to do it by degrees, and not to reduce him all at once.

Concerning those who clamor for what they call the reform of the civil service, while their designs are full of danger for bosses, and would result in their overthrow were they to be carried out, it does not appear that there is at present much reason for apprehension. For, in the first place, they demand that none shall hold certain offices who have not undergone examination as to their fitness; thinking that in this way they may prevent the boss from selecting those whom he favors. But unless they can deprive him of the power to say who the examiners shall be, they can do little more than put him to some inconvenience, while at the same time they give him the additional offices of the examiners to fill. Hence unless they can control the government altogether, they cannot take this power from a boss, and it will be politic for him to multiply the number of these examiners as much as possible, and especially to have large salaries attached to the places, but to be careful to fill them with men who are weak but of good reputation. In the second place, these reformers insist that no one shall be dis-

placed from any office after he once secures it, except for malfeasance. Now so long as the pay of these offices is more than is given by other employers, and the work less than they require, the envy of mankind will never permit those who are so fortunate as to obtain these places to hold them in peace. Hence the office-holders will be disposed to pay the proper assessments to the boss, fearing that otherwise he may find some way of displacing them; which, indeed, he can generally contrive to do.

On the other hand, should a boss suffer a temporary defeat, the reformers will have tied their own hands, so that they cannot remove his followers and replace them with their own favorites. Should they attempt this, every one would cry out against their inconsistency, and since they have little in the way of reward to promise their followers they are not likely to have a great number. Accordingly, as I say, it does not seem that the boss need stand in present dread of these reformers; but should they once turn their attention to reducing the number of offices and the amount of the salaries, and to making the heads of departments responsible for the performance

of a proper amount of work by their subordinates, as they seem now to be doing in the city of Brooklyn, then they would indeed become formidable. This, however, is not very likely to take place, for the reason which I shall next state.

For whatever clouds may seem now to overhang the pathway of a boss, a brilliant and glorious light is cast upon his future career by the increase of those who are called socialists. These people differ greatly among themselves concerning many of their doctrines, and the length to which they would carry them ; but they all agree in this, that governments should hereafter undertake many more things than at present. Some hold that the government of a city should furnish the citizens with light, and with communication by the telegraph and telephone, and should manage all the means of transportation ; and some add many other things. They entertain these opinions, they say, because they detest all monopoly as injustice, and as these things are now monopolies, they should be conducted so that the gain from them should go to the public and not to a few private citizens.

Some of them, it is true, consider land to be the only subject of monopoly, and reason that if the rent of land is confiscated or highly taxed, justice will be attained. But there is an increasing number who behold what they term natural monopolies everywhere, and whatever business can be monopolized they wish the government to monopolize. Such are the views of many of those who profess to teach the science called political economy, who are known among themselves as economists. Moreover, by reason of their regarding the present institutions as unjust to the poor, they generally favor the payment by government of higher wages to those whom it employs than they can earn elsewhere, and desire it to undertake all manner of public works.

Certainly a boss must be of a dull and sordid nature that would not look with delight upon the rapid increase of these people, and encourage them by every means in his power. For what does he himself desire but to increase the number of offices, and to pay more for services than they are currently worth, and to have the government undertake all manner of public works? Whatever these

reformers of society may aim at, they are evidently the best of allies for a boss; for they labor to increase his power of their own free will, and he need pay them nothing; whereas his own followers require to be paid. Nevertheless, since those who are greatly occupied in condemning the injustice of others are often negligent concerning their own virtue, a boss should endeavor to enlist secretly in his service some of the leaders of these people by gifts of office or other favors, as in this way he may secure many votes at small expense.

Some of the economists, also, may be won over by being flattered with appointments to positions of dignity, and other favors; provided the boss does not appear to court them too openly. For these persons generally seek to obtain a knowledge of political affairs by studying at the universities of other countries, and by reading books upon government that teach nothing concerning bosses or machines, but describe only the apparent rulers, such as mayors and governors and other elected officers—as if it were possible for these officers to be nominated without any political organization or machinery. And studying

books that treat of the administration of the affairs of cities where the populace has little voice in matters of taxation and expenditure, they consider that they know all that is to be known, and are thus easily reached through their vanity. Nor is it surprising that they should gladly see the government undertaking many new things, since they suppose that they shall reconstitute it as they desire, and that they and their disciples will then be in control; although they never consider in what manner the control is to be obtained.

It is doubtless true that men of this kind have not many followers among the wise, and are especially ridiculed by those who have experience of the manner in which human affairs are carried on; but they have not a little influence among the class from which reformers are generally drawn, and through their position they are enabled to impart their views to the young men that study at the universities. Hence if it were necessary to hire them to teach that there should be more offices and public works, to do so would be for the interest of a boss; but now they do this of their own accord. Since we have seen that the only reformers to be dreaded

by a boss are those who would reduce the expenses of government and the number of the office-holders, it is a fortunate thing that these reformers should be opposed by those from whom they might reasonably expect support; otherwise the security of bosses might have been already disturbed. But so long as the socialists have their present influence it will not be necessary for a boss to take any open part in urging measures for increasing his patronage. Like Julius Cæsar, he may affect modesty and coyness in deprecating the enlargement of his responsibilities, while the ignorance and folly of the citizens furnish him with ample opportunities for increasing his power.

CHAPTER XXI.

OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF FAVORS TO
BE OBTAINED FROM THE GOVERNMENT,
AND THE PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED
IN SECURING REVENUE FROM THOSE
WHO OBTAIN THEM.

IN addition to appointments to office, favors that may be obtained from the government, and are therefore controlled by a boss, are of two kinds. Of the first class are positive favors, or such as bring an actual gain or profit to those who receive them. The second class comprises what I call negative favors, which consist generally in relief from losses or penalties inflicted by the government or its officers. To consider the matter in detail, we see that positive favors may be dispensed in the awarding of contracts in such a manner that certain men may obtain them, although their bids are higher than would be made by others if there were no

favor in the competition. Similar favors are possible in the purchase of supplies, and in the letting or selling of property belonging to the city. In like manner profit may often be made by those who receive early knowledge of what is to be done in the way of public works and improvements and in various legal proceedings.

Favors may also be shown by the officers of the city in making weak defenses to actions and suits, and in acquiescing in the assessment of excessive damages in proceedings for the condemnation of lands for public uses. Also in what is called patronage, or the appointment to positions where the period of service and the emoluments are not prescribed by statute, there is much opportunity for the judicious distribution of favors, and this, too, among citizens of honorable reputation. Even in cases where the compensation is limited to a small sum by law, it has become the practice to exact more; and by inducing such citizens to accept these illegal fees, a boss may bring them insensibly to look upon his government with friendliness. By this means he may comply with the advice of Aristotle, when he says that a tyrant should show such

respect to men of merit in any line that they shall not think they could be more honored if their fellow-citizens were members of a free state; and that he should let it be understood by those who receive such honors that they come from himself.

Concerning favors of this kind I have already spoken, and need add only the general maxim that whenever any exceptional gain or profit is derived from the government, the amount received beyond what the service is worth, or the excess of gain over what could be obtained without favor, constitutes a fund from which contributions are to be made for the use of the boss or his followers. The danger of these contributions I have sufficiently explained; let the boss, therefore, if he cannot retain the control of them in his own hands, at least see that he is informed of their amount and that they are kept within narrow bounds, so as not to become a public scandal.

The revenue to be derived from what I have called negative favors is not only much greater than what is to be obtained from all other sources, but it is also infinitely safer. The cause for this I shall presently state; but

I will first consider some of the lesser forms of this revenue, to which many objections exist. It is to be observed, in the first place, that the officers of the government, and especially the police, may exact payments from those who have violated no law whatever, merely because their position enables them both to inflict injury or annoyance and to refuse protection. Thus shopkeepers will pay something to the policeman that guards their region, rather than feel that he is ill disposed and may not exert himself to defend their property against robbers and other mischievous persons; just as men not only pay the keeper of an inn for their entertainment, but also pay his servants in order to obtain proper attendance.

But it is evident, on the one hand, that no revenue of this kind is likely to reach the boss, for it is too petty for him to be concerned with; and, on the other hand, if these exactions are allowed, they may become so outrageous and intolerable to the citizens as to make them discontented and rebellious. For some policemen in this way obtain from the merchants of their precincts gifts of clothing sufficient for their families, besides food

and drink and other provisions; even the old women that sell nuts and apples at the street corners contributing of their stock. Such officers are, indeed, nearly supported by means of these presents, and they have their pay in addition. It is altogether for the interest of a boss to check with severity such practices as these, for in spite of all he can do they will prevail to a certain extent, and the revenue derived from them, either for himself or for the organization, is insignificant. If needful, let the salaries of the policemen be increased, so that they may be able to pay their assessments without inconvenience; but let them by all means be restrained from adding to their salaries by these methods. It is a cardinal maxim, for a boss as well as for all rulers, that revenue should be obtained with the least possible vexation of those who furnish it.

Of nearly the same character, and exposed to many of the same objections, is the revenue derived by the threat of loss or penalty on account of pretended or merely technical and trivial violations of laws and ordinances. For most citizens know little of the provisions of the laws relating to the govern-

ment of the city, and even less of the ordinances. The number of these regulations is countless, and the lawyers themselves cannot tell what they are without much study. Hence it happens every day that citizens violate some rule of conduct or other, and if those in authority are rapacious or ill disposed toward such citizens, they are exposed to frequent fines and arrests. Moreover there are many laws giving great and arbitrary powers to inspectors, whether of the construction of buildings, or of food, and many other things, and in all these cases the discretion of the inspector is made final by the law, and whatever he orders to be done must be done. It is easy for him, therefore, to relieve those whom he favors from compliance with the requirements of the law, or to insist that expensive changes must be made in buildings, or to let it be understood that if he is not propitiated such changes will be required.

Now so far as these laws are used to bring citizens into the organization, by making them understand that the payment of a moderate assessment will exempt them from annoyance and expense at the hands of inspec-

tors, they may be politic ; yet practices of this sort cause so much indignation among men of honor that even this is not certain. But so far as the inspectors appropriate what they exact to their own use, their conduct is altogether prejudicial to the power of the boss.

CHAPTER XXII.

OF THE PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH REVENUE IS TO BE OBTAINED BY MEANS OF NEGATIVE FAVORS.

THE revenue derived from the condonation of real violations of well-known laws is, upon all accounts, the most important to a boss. Speaking within bounds, this revenue is absolutely necessary to the existence of his power, and the art of cultivating it is for him the most essential of all arts. Concerning the nature of laws and justice this is not the place to discourse at length, but it is apparent that the laws enacted by our legislators are frequently nothing more than the wishes of a few men, or perhaps even of one man, craftily arranged and formulated so as to secure the force of the government as a sanction, and its aid in imposing these wishes as laws upon the citizens. In the language of most of those who write upon these matters, the enactment

of such laws by the legislators is called the expression of the will of the people; but in truth the people are generally ignorant of the laws that are passed, and, if they knew what they were, would frequently reject them. It is evident, therefore, that many laws now in force are unjust laws; by which I mean that they are thought unjust by a great portion of the people, who will disobey them without feeling guilty of sin, or at least will look upon those who disobey them with little disapprobation. Accordingly I divide all laws into those that are just and those that are unjust; calling those just which are approved by all, or nearly all, and those unjust which are thought so by large numbers.

Concerning just laws, it is only necessary to say that it is always unwise and unsafe for a boss to exempt from punishment those who violate them, or at least to allow this to be done openly, no matter how great offers of money may be made to secure immunity. For by such condonation the whole people will be enraged, and if it often occurs, they will infallibly rise and overthrow those who permit such abuses. This appears clearly enough from what happened to Boss Tweed.

The people endured many oppressions patiently under his rule, until they saw that his favorites were allowed to violate just laws with impunity, when they could be controlled no longer; and they not only drove out the boss, but nearly destroyed the organization also. Let a boss, therefore, neither attempt himself to secure revenue from this source, nor allow others to do so; and if it seem necessary at times to protect some favorite, let this be accomplished secretly through the delays and measures provided by the laws and the courts for the nullification of their own action, which will generally provide sufficient means of escape.

It is quite otherwise with unjust laws. There are some, it is true, that maintain that it is just for a citizen to obey an unjust law; but even these will admit that if the law is outrageously unjust it may be a greater sin to obey than to disobey it. But the greater part of mankind consider less whether an act is legal than whether it is right; and if they are not condemned by their own consciences or by the judgment of their neighbors, they care little for the condemnation of the law. Such men will therefore not hesitate to pay

money rather than suffer penalties for doing what they do not think wrong; and most of the citizens will think it so outrageous to inflict punishment in such cases that they will be pleased if the officers charged with the enforcement of the law wink at its violation. Herein, therefore, lies the greatest of all opportunities for a boss.

This subject is well explained by the wise philosopher, Adam Smith, in his treatise of the "Wealth of Nations." After reciting the laws devised for the protection of the makers of woolen goods in England (which provided that whoever carried a sheep out of the kingdom should forfeit all his goods and have his left hand cut off and suffer a year's imprisonment, and if he repeated the act should be put to death), and some later statutes of like spirit, he remarks that the morals of the people were not so corrupt as those of the contrivers of such laws. And concerning excessive taxes upon foreign goods brought into the country, he says that few people have any scruple about receiving smuggled goods; and indeed that to have any such scruples (though to receive such goods is a manifest encouragement to this violation of the rev-

enue laws, and to the perjury which almost always attends it) would in most countries be regarded as one of those pedantic pieces of hypocrisy which, instead of gaining credit with anybody, serve only to expose the person who affects to practise them to the suspicion of being a greater knave than most of his neighbors. Accordingly he says of the smuggler that by this indulgence of the public he is often encouraged to continue a trade which he is thus taught to consider as in some measure innocent; and that although he is no doubt highly blamable for violating the laws of his country, he is frequently incapable of violating those of natural justice, and would have been in every respect an excellent citizen had not the laws of his country made that a crime which nature never meant to be so.

Can there be any doubt as to the policy of a boss toward such laws? If he were to contrive with all the ingenuity with which he is endowed, and with the aid of all the philosophers that have ever written, he could never invent any system more exactly adapted to his purposes and requirements than this which others have constructed for him. For

the desire of a boss is to raise a revenue without authority of law, in order that he may not have to render any account concerning it, and to do this without causing the people to complain. Hence if he use his power to shield them from unjust laws, they will naturally feel grateful to him, and will gladly pay him any reasonable sum for such protection.

A boss ought therefore to encourage the passage of such laws, if he can do so without being known, although openly appearing to oppose them; and when they are enacted he should let it be understood that they will not be enforced against those citizens who contribute to the organization. This, of course, is not to be proclaimed openly, for a boss ought always to pretend to be desirous of carrying out the laws, but it can be made generally known without difficulty. But those who think that they may violate the law without making such contributions must be taught that this is not to be done with impunity. Nor is there any danger that they will complain loudly, no matter how much they may be aggrieved; for they will dread prosecution by the officers of the law, and in any case they make but a sorry figure when they call

upon the public for sympathy, since they admit that they are law-breakers, complaining only because they are punished more severely than others who commit the same offenses.

Were a boss to have the power to frame such an unjust law as would be most productive of revenue, and at the same time one of which the lax enforcement would be most popular, he would naturally select for prohibition such acts as are performed by a large number of the citizens so habitually that they seem necessary to them, and a part of their ordinary life, and therefore altogether proper and right. For it is evident that they will not cease these acts because the legislators have declared they shall, and they will therefore fly to the boss for protection. As it would be odious to the last degree for him to propose such a law, it must be regarded as extremely fortunate for him that certain of the citizens have voluntarily taken this burden upon their own shoulders, in procuring the enactment of statutes intended to prevent the drinking of fermented and distilled liquors. Some of these people are sincere, and, thinking these liquors to be poisonous, refrain from drinking them themselves, as

well as endeavor to restrain others. But most of them are not sincere, but are guilty of the hypocrisy described by Adam Smith; for they drink these liquors every day in their own houses and at their own clubs, while they try to forbid others from drinking them, either altogether or at least upon the first day of the week, called Sunday; and frequently they obtain laws intended to prevent poor men from obtaining these drinks, but not the rich.

Even when the laws that they procure do not altogether prohibit the poor from obtaining such drinks, they impose excessive taxes upon those that supply them, as if they were determined that the poor should obtain their drink only at a very great price and of bad quality; for the taxes are made so high that the dealers must needs buy what is cheap and therefore generally bad. In this way, by depriving the common people of sound and wholesome liquors upon the pretense that they are poisonous, they force them to content themselves with what is really poisonous. So, to prohibit the people from such recreation upon their weekly holiday as they are accustomed to is an unjust law, to be

welcomed by a boss, but not to so great an extent; for it is much more difficult to allow such a law to be violated without arousing public outcry; neither can so great a revenue be derived from permitting its violation.

There are other laws thought unjust by small numbers of the citizens; but the general principle is that the best law for the purposes of a boss is that which is thought unjust by the greatest number, and which prohibits acts which they desire to perform most frequently. Upon every account, therefore, the laws that prohibit citizens from selling or giving liquors to one another, either at all times or upon particular days, such as Sundays and other holidays, are to be favored by a boss. If he cannot procure the passage of such laws, then he should favor such as make it difficult to engage in this traffic, either by taxes or by refusal of license to all except a few. The best law is that which altogether prohibits the traffic, and the next best is that which makes permission to engage in it a matter of favor, or of payment of heavy fees. For in this way a monopoly is established in the hands of a few, and because they feel that they are unjustly treated

and persecuted by the government, they will combine to defend themselves, and will contribute liberally in their own defense and to prevent the competition of those who do not pay equal contributions.

It may seem strange, since the greater part of the inhabitants of New York are in the habit of daily drinking fermented and distilled liquors, and think it no sin, that such laws should prevail. This is because these laws have been enacted by the legislature of the state and not by the people of the city ; and indeed they have been passed in defiance of their wishes. For the Irish in their wretched estate in their native land, as I have already pointed out, have had scarce any pleasure but the drinking of whisky, of which, on account of their poverty and the severity of the excise, they could get but little. But when they come to this country they find that whisky is more cheaply obtained, and, as they expect greater freedom here, they are enraged when the law threatens to deprive them of liquor altogether. The Germans also are equally exasperated, for they are used in the evening and upon Sundays, in their own country, all to go, both priest and

people, men and women and children, to gardens and halls where they drink beer and listen to music and look at plays; and they think it is not wrong but right to do so. As they do not believe what is right upon that side of the ocean to become wrong when they cross to this, and as their chief enjoyments are drinking beer and hearing music, they are outraged by our sumptuary laws, and were it not for their habits of submission they would openly rebel against them.

Accordingly both the Germans and the Irish will loyally support a boss, unless his government is very oppressive, provided he will alleviate the severity of the excise, so that those who do not wish to fast may not be compelled to do so by those who are able to escape the necessity. Both of these peoples will therefore adhere to the organization and contribute freely, so long as the boss procures them relief; especially those among them who make the sale of liquors their business. But the boss must look to it that they are not called upon for other than the regular contributions, for if the policemen and other retainers are permitted to levy blackmail, great discontent will arise. But if he is care-

ful in this matter, he need not be anxious about his rule so long as the legislature of the state imposes laws of this kind upon the inhabitants of the city of New York.

The best friends of the boss, therefore, are those who denounce most furiously the buyers and sellers of drink; for these dealers are naturally angry at the foul language with which they are assailed, and they are apprehensive of the greatest injustice should their assailants obtain the power. Hence they combine for self-defense, and place their whole force, which is very great, at the service of the boss, looking to him as their only refuge. But if they were justly treated, they would cease to contribute to the organization, and would be indifferent to what happened to the boss; nor is it probable that he could maintain his power without their assistance. It is therefore every way to his interest to have them continually assailed, in order that they may remain steadfast in their allegiance to him.

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF THE REVENUE TO BE DERIVED FROM CORPORATIONS.

THE plan of this treatise does not permit me to enter into minute details, or to discuss the application of general rules to particular cases. There is one subject, however, of so great consequence, by reason of the magnitude of the revenues affected, that it would be unwise to pass it by. The law concerning those who associate themselves in any enterprise provides that the whole of the property of every associate shall, if necessary, be devoted to the payment of the debts incurred in the enterprise. In order to escape this onerous requirement, as well as some others, but especially this, it is customary to form what are called corporations; as to which the law is that only such property as is contributed to make the capital stock of the corporation can be called upon to satisfy the debts

incurred in its business. Every one, therefore, knows the utmost that he can possibly lose, and almost all great undertakings are now carried on through incorporations. Indeed in no other way could they be carried on; for few individuals have so great property as to enable them to undertake such works by themselves, and men are only willing to incur the liability of partners when they are associated with a very few others whom they know intimately. The industry of modern times, therefore, has come to depend upon the laws affecting corporations.

It was formerly true that the legislators, seeing the gain to the people in providing this means for the application of property to industry, favored corporations, and granted them powers, such as that of eminent domain, properly belonging only to the community. By this means, and by many improvements in the art of transporting both things and men, some of these corporations came to attain great magnitude. When this has taken place, for nearly the same reasons that make a boss necessary in the government of cities, the management of their affairs falls into the hands of one man. or a very few men, of great wealth

and capacity. Such men are by nature ambitious, and by the conditions of their place unscrupulous; for if they were not ambitious they would never reach the position, and if they were not unscrupulous they would not retain it, any more than a boss. For the struggle after traffic in which they must engage when they have competitors does not permit them to keep faith with one another, their agreements concerning their charges being numberless and very costly, but in many cases broken as soon as made. But when they have no competitors, then they are tempted to exact excessive charges.

It results from this that many things unjust and oppressive to the people are done by the officers of corporations, so that a certain odium has come to attach to the very name. The common people being naturally envious of the rich, and hearing of these oppressions, forget the great gains that have come to them through corporate enterprises, and clamor against them. In this clamor the journals, thinking to please the people, join, and at the present time the legislators are openly hostile to corporations and only favor them in secret. For two reasons the corporations

are at their mercy, and must pay for favors if they would have them. In the first place, their property is not so free as that of an individual, nor is it so well protected against confiscation by our constitutions or bills of rights; and secondly, the property of a great corporation generally tends to become fixed, so that it cannot be withdrawn, both in things immovable and in what is called the goodwill of its business.

Under such circumstances it is easy to see what will happen. The legislators, rejoicing in the opportunity of gratifying at the same time the hatred of the common people and their own cupidity, would, unless restrained, commit the folly of the peasant who, according to the fable, killed the goose that laid him golden eggs, the quicker to gratify his avarice. By means of new taxes, and additional requirements, and provisions for regulation and inspection, and commissions, and many other devices, the legislators of New York would probably in a few years confiscate the gains made by most of the corporations of that state; while by means of special charters they would endeavor to raise others in their place. The managers of the corporations, therefore,

must either see themselves robbed of their property or defend it by inducing the legislators to desist from their attacks. So rapacious, however, have the legislators become that the cost of this defense is now a heavy charge upon the corporations, and their managers are in constant terror so long as the legislature sits.

Here, too, the economists take an important part, for they declare that the corporations are monopolies and keep gains for themselves that belong to the whole people; by which the legislators are greatly encouraged to continue plundering in the name of justice. But from the time when the children of Israel seized the possessions of the Canaanites upon the ground of their wickedness, and the kings of Europe in the middle ages confiscated the wealth of the Jews on account of their extortion, and those who came from the Old World drove out the natives of this continent because they were heathen, down to the present day, when the children of the missionaries of Hawaii have overthrown the government of that country upon the ground of the depravity of the people converted by their parents, this has always been the best of reasons why

one man should possess himself of the property of another.

The policy of a boss, under such conditions, hardly needs to be explained. If he is wise he will interfere to prevent the ruin of the community through the rapacity of the legislators. He will, it is true, be hated by them as snatching the prey from their mouths, but, on the other hand, he will be looked upon as a protector by the corporations. It was in this way that the king of France established the royal power, many centuries ago, so that it endured for ages. For the nobles took advantage of their powers and oppressed the trading corporations of that time, whereupon the king took their part and obtained not only their loyalty, but a large and certain revenue as well, while he was at the same time enabled to curb the nobility.

A boss must, however, concede something to the legislators, nor should this be any mean sum; for he will have trouble in controlling those who are not from his own city. Upon the other hand, the corporations will gladly pay him a large and certain revenue to be relieved from constant attacks and to obtain such laws as they need. They will,

moreover, appoint to places in their service such persons as he desires; and in this way he can provide for many of his followers and for some of the legislators. He can also cause such servants, and even others, to join the organization and contribute to its revenue, for he can have them displaced if they refuse, as is done in the case of those corporations that transport passengers in the streets of New York.

A boss can also provide for his followers by having laws passed creating commissioners to oversee various corporations, and he may even make the pay of these followers a charge upon the corporations. But if he does this he should let the corporations select commissioners that are agreeable to them, and in this, as always, he should carefully abstain from arousing discontent by making his exactions too high. He should never demand so much as to make any business unprofitable or even less profitable than others. His only safety lies in causing those who have wealth and power to think that it is better for them to submit to his rule rather than to risk the exactions of the legislature or to fly to the unknown ills of revolution.

CHAPTER XXIV.

OF THE USE TO BE MADE OF THE PUBLIC JOURNALS.

ALL the common people at the present day obtain their knowledge of everything except their own personal affairs through the public journals. Few things, therefore, are of more importance to a boss than the accounts which these journals give of his rule. He cannot now imprison or put to death those writers that offend him, but it is in his power to injure them or to benefit them at his pleasure. The power to do this comes through the law, in the same way that the power to use the offices is obtained. For as the law provides higher salaries for the holders of office than their services are worth, so it also provides that many things shall be printed in the journals and paid for at a much higher rate than the cost. The owners of

the journals generally contrive these laws, representing that the public needs to be informed in this way of many legal matters that in no wise concern it, although it is absurd to suppose that such advertisements are read by every one, or that those interested are not likely to be otherwise informed ; for which, indeed, the law generally provides.

But as the owner of a journal is seldom able to have the law prescribe that such advertisements shall be printed in his own particular publication, since thus his greed would be too apparent, he is exposed to competition, and is therefore to a great extent at the mercy of the politicians and, in the city of New York, of the boss. For it is in their power, or his, to deprive a certain journal altogether of this lucrative patronage, or to compel it to share its excessive profits. In many other ways a boss can make it for the interest of the owner of a journal to be his friend, but of these I will refer to one alone. It generally happens that the owner of a journal, if he be also one of its writers, comes to look upon himself as greater than other men, because he sees the multitude believing what he lays before them ; and when he has be-

come puffed up in this way he immediately desires to obtain some office of distinction. To such a man it is plain the assistance of the boss will be of the greatest value, and he will therefore give the boss all the assistance in his power if he can secure his favor. A wise boss, therefore, need seldom meet with much difficulty in making these people his friends.

Nothing would be more mistaken, however, than to suppose that any open profession of friendship is either practicable or desirable. For it is necessary that those who read a journal should be accustomed to assume that those who write it are wise and disinterested men. To publish a journal, as has been recently done, in the avowed interest of a boss is a piece of the greatest folly. No one outside of the organization will read such a journal, and for the followers of the boss to be compelled to buy it is nearly sufficient to cause a revolt within their ranks. On the other hand, the people have become so used to the foul and abusive language of the writers of journals that they are not influenced by their denunciation of parties and organizations, or even of particular bosses, so long as

it is expressed in familiar and general terms, and no definite charges, supported by evidence, are brought forward. A prudent boss will therefore encourage journals secretly friendly to him to speak in this harmless way, in order to disarm suspicion; arranging at the same time that all really dangerous and odious charges shall be avoided, and that when any actual movement against him is undertaken it shall be opposed upon plausible grounds. Thus, if the Reformers undertake to elect candidates of their own to office in defiance of the boss, he should direct his journals professing to be of the Republican party to join indeed in denouncing him, but to maintain at the same time that it is unwise for citizens of the Republican party to vote for any candidates except those nominated by the Republican organization. So long as this policy is adhered to, the Reformers can always be defeated; for if all the Republicans be against them, as well as the boss, their numbers are too few for them to prevail.

The boss should therefore explain to these writers what things he really desires and what he cares nothing about, so that they may fiercely denounce the latter and be silent

concerning the former. He should permit them to speak evil of him when he is strong, and warn them to be moderate in their language when he is in real danger. He should see that they make false charges against him of such a kind as he can openly disprove, in order that the people may think that he is falsely accused in other respects also. By carefully attending to this policy the boss will after a time cause a great number of citizens to believe either that he is a good ruler or else that it is impossible to find out anything concerning him that is trustworthy. Nor should he forget that as he is a secret ruler it is much better that he should be little talked of or thought about; but if he must be discussed, then let as little as possible be said of him, or else let the journals publish a great deal continually. By the former policy the citizens will not be aroused to interest, and by the latter their interest will be quickly fatigued. For men have many other things to think of besides their government, and they soon weary of hearing that it is corrupt, if no plan for reforming it at once is available. If a boss observes these maxims he will generally receive from the journals more benefit

than injury; but it is dangerous to attack them and really arouse their hostility.

This may be illustrated by an example, given by Aristotle, of the peril to tyrants of arousing resentment by injury. He mentions that Decamnichus was the chief cause of the conspiracy against Archelaus, the occasion of his resentment being that Archelaus had delivered him to Euripides the poet to be scourged; for Decamnichus had greatly offended Euripides by speaking of the foulness of his breath. Nearly the same thing recently took place in this city; for the editor of a journal, Godkin, grievously offended Mitchell the police justice by showing that he had formerly kept a tavern resorted to by thieves, and saying certain other evil things concerning him; whereupon the boss permitted this writer to be imprisoned by Mitchell. The consequence was the same as in the case of Decamnichus; for the man was already sufficiently ill disposed toward the rule of the boss, and his imprisonment only rendered him more implacable, so that he became the most formidable of all the conspirators against the organization. Now it is evident that neither could the breath of

Euripides be purified by the scourging of Decamnichus, nor the reputation of Mitchell by the imprisonment of Godkin; and even if this could have been done it would not have been of sufficient importance either to the tyrant or the boss to justify his imperiling his dominion.

Let the boss, then, avoid needlessly enraging a notoriously irritable class, who are above all men wise in their own conceit, as he would avoid stirring up a swarm of wasps. For a man is more powerful and wiser than many wasps; nevertheless a few of them when aroused will put the boldest man to flight. Since it is possible for the boss to propitiate most of these editors by money or office or the promise of them, let him not neglect this simple means of converting annoying and mischievous adversaries into secret but useful friends.

CHAPTER XXV.

OF THE RELATIONS OF THE BOSS OF NEW YORK TO THE ORGANIZATION OF THE REPUBLICANS.

I HAVE hitherto principally confined myself to explaining the rules of conduct to be observed by the boss in his relations with the organization of his followers, which is now commonly called the machine, but is in the city of New York also called Tammany Hall, from the place of meeting of the chiefs. I have also given some reasons for thinking that too much power is given to the chiefs of the thirty districts into which the city is divided, although no danger is to be apprehended by the boss from the district committees, which appoint the eleven hundred captains of the election precincts; because the boss can take advantage of the

rivalries and jealousies of the members, and see that such men are made captains as he desires. Accordingly the policy of doubling the number of the district leaders, so that there shall be two in each assembly district, is to be commended; for they will infallibly be jealous of each other, and the boss by giving ear secretly first to one and then to the other will come soon to understand their real dispositions and designs, and learn how far every man is to be trusted and how far he is to be feared. It would indeed be possible to speak at greater length upon all these things, and to give illustrations of what has been done that is to be commended and of what has been done that is blameworthy; but I shall have effected my purpose if I have laid down some general rules with sufficient clearness to enable a boss to apply them to particular cases.

Concerning the organization of the Republicans it might seem that a boss need not concern himself, but such an opinion would be altogether mistaken. For, by reason of the frequent elections provided by our laws, a boss is exposed to incessant attacks, and, since most men call themselves either Repub-

licans or Democrats, it is probable that those who plot against the Boss of New York will endeavor to make use of the Republican machine—at least so long as the boss controls the Democratic organization. On the other hand, should another organization be formed among the Democrats hostile to the boss, it is evident that the Republicans might hold the balance of power, and in that event the boss would be compelled to make terms with them in some way. This he can do, but the Reformers cannot, because they dare not offer either money or offices, and without these the leaders of the Republicans cannot be won over.

It is obvious, therefore, that the manner in which the Republicans are organized can never be a matter of indifference to a boss. To say this would be like maintaining that a general need not interest himself in the organization of the army of his enemy. The organization of the Republicans, indeed, deserves not only his careful attention, but also his active intervention and participation. Hence it is altogether for his interest that this organization should be controlled by a boss, or by only a few chiefs; for it will be

necessary to purchase their allegiance, which would be impossible were they very numerous, their rapacity being such that all the offices and salaries in the city of New York would not satisfy them.

Hence it is indispensable for a boss to have a certain number of these chiefs constantly in his pay, even when there are no dangerous plots against him; otherwise they may be displaced and he be left without allies at a time when he sorely needs them. This may be easily accomplished by having the legislature pass laws for what are called non-partizan commissions, which will give the boss a certain number of offices to be distributed among such of the Republican politicians as will be of most service to him. No difficulty will be experienced in this, for politicians are, by their very occupation, venal, and provided they obtain money they care little whence it comes. Thus when a dangerous uprising takes place, headed by those who are indifferent to party names, but desire to have the government of the city administered according to their notions, the secret allies of the boss who direct the organization of the Republicans will proclaim that only those who

are faithful to the Republican party are fit to hold office. They will accordingly propose such men as the Reformers cannot accept; for the latter will think them no better than those already in power.

In this way the schemes of the Reformers can generally be brought to nothing, for, as I have said before, they are never numerous enough to succeed if the Republican organization is against them. There can be no doubt, therefore, that it is the part of wisdom for a boss to pay the Republican leaders with great liberality so long as they will pursue this policy. But whether it is better to use money and other favors, or to turn over to them certain offices, it is not altogether easy to decide. For if some offices are allowed to the Republicans, many of that party will be pleased, and think that greater success of this kind may be obtained in the future; while if money and favors are secretly employed, the great mass of the Republicans, being ignorant of this, will be inclined to think that their party can hope for no success, and will be disposed to listen to the arguments of the Reformers. Hence the advantage of the non-partizan commissions which I have de-

scribed. But the greatest forethought and caution must be exercised in entering into treaties of this kind, and they should not be resorted to if the same advantages can be secured in any other way.

CHAPTER XXVI.

OF THE POLICY TO BE PURSUED BY A BOSS REGARDING THE STATE GOVERNMENT.

HAVING examined in detail the measures to be followed by a boss in maintaining a trained force, and in raising a suitable revenue, and in regulating the government of his city, it remains now to show in what manner he should arrange his external relations. As I have already pointed out, these are of two classes: the relations to the government of his state and the relations to the general government. Of these the former are by far the more important. How important they are appears at once when we consider that all the laws under which the government of the city of New York is carried on are enacted by the legislature of the state; that all the offices to be filled are created by the same

body, and the salaries attached to them generally fixed; that it is in the power of this body to administer the government of the city through commissioners appointed by it, without consulting with the boss; that by doing away with sumptuary laws it could dry up the principal revenue of the boss at its very source; and that it could take from his hands the control of the police, of the finances, and, more than all, of the judges.

In view of all that may come to the boss from this quarter, both evil and good, it is impossible to exaggerate the necessity of adopting and consistently following the proper policy. For, as Machiavelli says in speaking of the Romans, it is the duty of every wise ruler, not only to provide a remedy for present evils, but at the same time to anticipate such as are likely to occur. By foreseeing them at a distance they are easily remedied; but if we wait till they have surrounded us the time is past and the malady is become incurable. It happens then as it does to physicians in the cure of a consumption, which in the commencement is easy to cure and difficult to understand, but when it has neither been discovered in due time nor treated upon

a proper principle, it becomes easy to understand and difficult to cure. The same thing takes place in state affairs. By foreseeing them at a distance, which is only done by men of talents, the evils which arise in a government are soon cured ; but when, from want of foresight, they are suffered to increase to such a height that they are perceptible to every one, there is no longer any remedy.

Let us, then, carefully consider the nature of the government of the state of New York. There is, in the first place, a Governor, who is elected by the majority of the voters, and who has, in addition to some minor powers, the great power of forbidding the passage of laws. This power is absolute, unless two thirds in number of the legislators are in favor of the law, and the office of Governor is therefore of great importance. There is also a Senate, composed of thirty-two members, and an Assembly, of one hundred and twenty-eight members, every one of whom is chosen by the voters residing in a particular district. Those are mistaken who imagine that these numbers are of no consequence, and that it would be the same thing if they were doubled. The number of voters in the state being,

perhaps, a million and a half, it is evident at once that every legislator must represent a great many thousand citizens; and whenever this is the case it is inevitable, from the causes that I explained at the beginning of this treatise, that the nomination of candidates should fall into the hands of the politicians. If the number of legislators were greatly increased, this would not be true to the same extent; for where a community or a district has but a few thousand people they all know one another, and therefore they know the character of the man for whom they are asked to vote.

Hence it is for the advantage of a boss that the number of legislators should be as small as possible; for so long as the politicians determine who they shall be it is possible for the boss to have an understanding with them; and, moreover, when it becomes necessary to purchase legislation, there are not so many to be paid. But in the case of the Governor, although the politicians nominate him, yet they are more limited in their selection; for it is necessary to nominate a man of some distinction and ability for the place, or there may be danger that he will be defeated through the disgust of the people. It may not be at

first sight evident, but it is nevertheless true, that the people of the whole state are likely to know more concerning the character of their Governor than the people of a district to know of the man who represents them in the Senate or Assembly. Men are interested in a few great and prominent officers, but they cannot carry in their minds the names and histories of a multitude of petty ones.

The government of the state being thus constituted, and the people of the state being divided into two parties, Republican and Democratic, the membership of the legislature will be, for the most part, determined by the politicians that control the party organizations. As to the legislators chosen from the city of New York, there can be little difficulty, as a rule, in securing the return not only of such Democrats, but also of such Republicans, as are satisfactory to the boss. As to the choice of Democratic representatives outside of the city of New York, the matter is not without difficulty. If a boss attempts by direct action to secure the nomination of men who will obey him, he is sure to arouse such opposition and jealousy as will cause him embarrassment, if not defeat. On the

other hand, if he enters into negotiations with the politicians of the region, he engages in very complicated matters that may lead to unexpected entanglements. I shall presently give some examples of this, but for the present it is sufficient to say that a boss must be guided by circumstances, and that only one general rule can be laid down, viz., that he should not be induced to pay too high a price for support of this kind.

It is a serious question whether it is not better policy for a boss to spend money in winning over his open enemies, rather than in inducing those to support him who are to a certain extent bound to do so by their party allegiance. I have already explained the importance of having an understanding with the leaders of the Republicans in the city of New York, and nearly the same reasons exist for a secret alliance with those who control the party in the state; if indeed they be not the same persons. For the revenues available to politicians in the other parts of the state are much smaller than in the city of New York, and it is possible to obtain many supporters at a moderate cost. Especially when Republican legislators have shown that

they are disposed to carry out the wishes of a boss, he may be able to secure their fidelity by assistance when they are struggling to obtain renomination. Thus it will be generally possible for a boss to have a sufficient number of legislators under his control, or favorably disposed to him, to guard against very injurious measures.

Hitherto we have looked at this matter from one point of view, as if a boss were exposed to attack and must secure allies in order to defend himself. We should, however, recollect that the Boss of New York is infinitely more powerful, through the great force at his disposal, and because of his large revenues, than any of the politicians that aspire to be bosses throughout the state. It is a timid and pusillanimous policy that induces a powerful boss to make such terms with his inferiors as imply that they are conferring a favor on him by entering into the treaty. He should rather take the position that they are in his power and that he can ruin them if he chooses, and induce them to render their support more as a means of their own preservation than as a favor. It is true that if all of these politicians should enter into a conspir-

acy against him, their combined power might be greater than his. Let us recall, however, the observation of Machiavelli. History, he says, is filled with conspiracies; but how few have been crowned with success! No one can carry on such a design alone nor trust any accomplices but malcontents. These frequently denounce their confederates and frustrate their designs, in the hope of obtaining a large remuneration from him against whom they are leagued. Hence those with whom you are necessarily associated in a conspiracy are placed between the temptation of a considerable reward and the dread of a great danger; so that, to keep the secret, it must either be intrusted to a very extraordinary friend of your own or to an irreconcilable enemy of the boss. Thus it is almost impossible that a combination should be formed against a boss by the politicians outside of the city without his gaining early knowledge of it; and if he have this knowledge he should at once, by threatening some and cajoling others, divide their counsels and render them futile.

No objection exists to the granting of favors to these petty bosses, so long as this can

be done without impairing the power of a boss in his own city ; but the emergency must be indeed grave to justify his incurring odium on their account, either among his followers or among the people whom he rules. It does not admit of doubt that several very grave mistakes of this kind have been recently made, of which the evil consequences have already to some extent appeared, and will still further appear. These mistakes have been so serious, and the principle which they illustrate is of such importance, that they require examination by themselves, and I shall therefore dismiss the subject for the present. But so far as secret alliances with the leaders of the Republicans are concerned, although these alliances tend to produce discontent among the followers of a boss, who do not understand why rewards should be given to those apparently hostile to them, yet if he has observed the rules which have been presented here concerning the discipline of his forces he need not hesitate to suppress these murmurs by proper punishment. He need feel the less anxiety because the conferring of these rewards has a tendency to pacify the people, who conceive that an equitable dis-

tribution of offices is taking place in spite of the boss, and who reason, therefore, that his power over them is not so absolute as the Reformers represent.

In short, the maxims that are to be observed by a boss in ordering his relations with the state government are few and simple: First, to bear it always in mind that the preservation of his own power is the supreme end, and therefore to do nothing for another, nor tolerate anything from another, that may interfere with this. Second, to limit his assistance to other politicians to such an amount as will not make any one so powerful as to be able to do him much injury, and to extend it only to those who are ready to give the strongest pledges of their fidelity and gratitude. Third, to require, as the first condition of his aid, that all legislation relating to the city of New York shall be approved by him. Fourth, to forbid his own legislators to collect revenue for themselves, through threats of legislation against the rich, or through promises of legislation in their favor. All such revenues belong properly to the boss, but he will be compelled to divide them, not only with his own legislators, but also with the

leaders from other parts of the state; otherwise his own legislators will be driven by hunger to listen to plots against him. For their pay is not sufficient to meet the expenses of their elections, and they must be reimbursed, and that liberally. So with the other leaders: they must be allowed a bountiful share of this revenue, or they will turn against the boss and pass laws that may do him great harm. But if he will aid them in passing such laws as bring them in much revenue, they will generally allow him to do as he desires in other things. This he can well afford to do, provided he retain the control of the revenues of the city of New York.

CHAPTER XXVII.

OF THE COURSE TO BE FOLLOWED BY A BOSS IN NATIONAL POLITICS.

A BOSS who desires to maintain himself in security in his own dominion will always consider the effect upon his own fortunes of any action which he is urged to take in national politics. We have seen that in the politics of the state of New York this is true, because the state government directly controls that of the city of New York, and therefore it cannot be safely neglected by a boss. It is otherwise with the government of the United States; for it has very little to do with that of this city, and, so far as the laws enacted by Congress are concerned, it is, as a rule, a matter of very slight consequence to a boss what they are, with an exception which I shall presently notice. But, owing to the fact that the Custom-house at New York gives employ-

ment to great numbers of men, and the Post-office also, to say nothing of the offices of the United States Attorney and Marshal, and some others, it is worth while to exercise as much control as possible over these appointments, in spite of the inconvenience caused by the civil-service laws, which greatly limit their number. Hence it is necessary for a boss to study well his relations to national politics and to the administration.

In order to understand clearly the difficulties that arise in determining these relations, let us first consider the policy to be pursued by a boss regarding the choice of the United States Senators from the state of New York. It is proper to begin with this matter, because it is customary for the President of the United States to appoint such men to office as are proposed by the Senators from the states where the offices which are to be filled exist, at least when they are of his party; and if a boss desires to have such appointments made to his satisfaction, it would seem that he must first make sure of the Senators. To make the subject entirely plain a number of possibilities must be considered; for the President may be of one party and the Senators may

be either of that party or of another ; and the policy of a boss must be different in every contingency.

It might at first sight seem beyond question that if the President is a Democrat the boss should procure the election of Democratic Senators. It is true that this may frequently be wise ; but let the boss remember that if he allows some politician to be elected who has not been in the habit of obeying him, he places a man at Washington who is inevitably puffed up by his position, and who will be disposed to insist that his own friends and followers shall be appointed to the offices in the city of New York, as well as throughout the state. The reason of this is to be found in the length of the term of the office of Senator—which may exceed the duration of the power of a boss—and the honor of the position ; for as the Senators of old were frequently statesmen and men of wisdom, there is a tradition among the people regarding the office which makes whoever holds it think himself wise. Therefore, unless a boss can make sure of the fidelity of the politician whom he causes to be elected, either by written pledges or in some other way, it may not

be politic for him to bring about the election of Democratic Senators.

This will be more apparent if we consider the case of a Democratic President and Republican Senators. Such Senators could have little influence with the President in filling the offices, and he would naturally turn to the boss for advice, particularly if he were satisfied that the boss had been or would be friendly to him. If the President came from the state of New York, he might, it is true, insist upon appointing his own friends, and upon this account it seems more desirable that he should come from some other state; but even then the organization might be sufficiently recognized. Upon the whole, therefore, this case is likely to be the most favorable to the power of a boss.

Let us next examine the situation when the President is a Republican. It is evident that then a Democratic Senator would be of no use whatever to a boss, no matter how great his fidelity; for the President could seldom have any motive for paying any attention to him. But let us consider what would take place if the boss entered into an arrangement with the Republican leaders for the election

of Republican Senators. The result would be that these leaders could make sure that the Senators chosen by them would make such appointments as they desired. Hence if a proper treaty has been previously made with these leaders by a boss, there will generally be little danger that the men appointed will be positively hostile to him ; and, by the terms of the treaty, he may be left secure in his own dominion. But it is almost always the case, among the Republicans of this state especially, that there are some men, eminent as speakers or as editors of journals, who are consumed with desire to be Senators and who will gladly make treaties with a boss to bring this about.

There can be no doubt that such treaties are for the interest of a boss. If any one questions it, I repeat—the President of the United States is either a Democrat or a Republican. If he is a Democrat, a Republican Senator can do a boss at all events no harm, and may render him services in his own state. And if the President is a Republican, then also a Republican Senator, especially if he has been aided by the boss, will do no harm ; for the President will appoint Republicans to

office no matter who is Senator. In such a case a Democratic Senator would be useless ; and if the President is a Democrat, a Senator of that party would be superfluous, if not positively mischievous. Yet it must be acknowledged that there may be special reasons for acting in particular ways upon particular occasions, and while treaties of the kind I have described are for the advantage of a boss, he should exercise the greatest care that they do not become publicly known ; for if they do, he may suffer more from the charge of treachery than he will gain by the provisions of the treaty.

I said that with one exception the laws of the United States little concerned a boss of New York. That exception is the case of a law imposing an income tax. The collector of this tax in the city of New York will become altogether the most important officer under any existing government. No Roman proconsul or prefect, no Persian satrap or Turkish pasha, ever had such opportunities for enriching himself as this officer will have, and he could easily make his revenue exceed that of the boss himself. For, in addition to the tax, many men will gladly pay great

sums to the collector rather than disclose the secrets of their trade or business; and this collector will be armed with power to compel even the boss to render an account of all the revenue which he receives, and to disclose the particulars of his transactions with the organization and with his followers. No sacrifice can be too great for the boss to make in order to secure control of this appointment; not merely that he may participate in its emoluments, but especially that he may avert the ruin that would come upon him were he compelled to reveal the sources of his revenue.

As to that part of the external policy of a boss which involves the nomination of a candidate for the office of President of the United States, the temptation is very great to make a display of power. No doubt it is a dazzling idea to a boss to be able to decide who shall be the chief ruler of the greatest nation of the earth, especially since the people are reputed to select their own rulers. A boss, however, who allows himself to be carried away by visions of this character, without considering what may be the effect upon his own power, is more likely to diminish his in-

fluence than to extend it, and may even bring about his own ruin through his overreaching ambition.

For a boss may either succeed or not succeed in procuring the nomination of such a man as he desires. If he does not succeed he is laughed at throughout the country, and his followers lose confidence, not only in his ability, but also in his good fortune. Since the strength of rulers consists essentially in the opinion that is commonly entertained of their strength, nothing can be more disadvantageous to a boss than to be defeated in what he has openly undertaken. He not only makes a dangerous enemy in the candidate whom he opposed, but he encourages the Reformers to believe that if he can be beaten abroad he may be at home. If he succeeds he may, it is true, preserve his own prestige; but as it is very difficult to persuade the people not to reject any candidate openly favored by a boss, his victory is likely to be a barren one.

To place this matter in the clearest light, we must attentively examine the nature and extent of the interest of a boss of New York in the success of the party to which he belongs in

the national elections. Certainly the mere display of his power, without positive results, cannot be regarded as greatly for his interest. The policy to be adopted in the legislation of Congress is generally a matter of entire indifference to him. The only thing, therefore, in which he is concerned, is the appointment of national officers in the city of New York. In determining his policy he must inquire concerning every step how it will affect this supreme object. If he is certain that some man whom he favors can not only be nominated but also elected, and if he is also certain that after this man is elected he will make satisfactory appointments, then indeed a boss would be foolish not to embrace his opportunity. But how often is this likely to happen? In order to be certain as to the appointments it is necessary to select a politician willing to pledge himself to do what is required of him. But such a man can seldom have much standing in the party, and is certain to be either unknown or odious to the people. It will therefore be difficult to nominate him, and more difficult to elect him. The consequences of defeat, as we have seen, are so serious as to make it unwise to

risk them for such precarious chances of victory.

On the other hand, if a boss favor unostentatiously some man from another state who is already strong with the party and not hated by the people, and such a man is nominated and elected, he will be likely to make the appointments which the boss desires; for he will naturally be grateful and will have no reason to favor any other organization in the state. Besides, whenever any man becomes President, he immediately begins to cast about for means whereby he may be reëlected, and therefore he is anxious not to offend those who have aided him. A boss, therefore, can generally arrive at a good understanding with the candidate of his party for the Presidency, even if he is not able to obtain positive pledges.

If, however, it becomes evident that the candidate of the Democrats will not do what is desired in making the appointments, and if he can be defeated by a secret alliance of the boss with the leaders of the Republicans, this will generally be the part of wisdom. For these leaders require to be rewarded in some way, and if they can obtain the national offices in this city and in the state, they will

need nothing more from the boss. Moreover they consider these of the greatest consequence, and in order to make sure of them they will consent to any terms required by him; so that he may not only arrange that the national officers shall not be hostile to him, but also provide for whatever legislation he desires in the state. There are other cases to be considered, but I have said enough to make it evident that in these external relations the policy of the boss is to be determined exclusively by regard to his own force and his own interests in the city of New York, and not by any vain dreams of extending his dominion throughout the country.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

OF SOME MISTAKES LATELY COMMITTED IN THE CONDUCT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

THIS is the proper place to illustrate the principles that I have laid down by examples from recent political history. Many circumstances indicate that the power of the boss in the city of New York is greatly shaken, and that not only the citizens, but also many of his own followers, are either already conspiring against him or are prepared to do so; although a few years ago his rule appeared to be absolute. Moreover, Boss Billy Sheehan of Buffalo, and Boss McLaughlin of Brooklyn, and Boss McKane of Coney Island, have all been cast down, and their ruin is so complete that it is doubtful if they will ever rise again. In the case of Boss Sheehan and Boss

McKane there may be nothing that is not easy to understand; for both their wisdom and their forces were small, and they seem to have disregarded most of the counsels both of Aristotle and of Machiavelli as completely as if they had never written. But Boss McLaughlin was thought to be a wise boss, and his power was apparently as firmly established as that of the Boss of New York. There must therefore have been some common cause in operation in all these cases.

It is an observation of Aristotle's that revolutions are generally brought about by some trifling occasion, while the real cause lies beneath the surface. The occasion of all this ruin to the bosses of New York was indeed trifling, being merely the choice of a judge for the Appellate Court of the state. But the candidate of the Democrats for this place was a man without distinction either as a judge or as a lawyer, and one whose conduct in carrying out the orders of politicians in defiance of the law had made him odious to the most eminent of his own profession and to a very great number of the people. When it became rumored that it was the intention of the leaders of the Democrats to nominate

this man, an outcry arose on every side, so that it was apparent that there would be an uprising among the people against him. It is conceivable that there might be circumstances which would make it necessary to nominate such a candidate; but in this case there were no such circumstances. The man had no followers and was powerless for injury; so that, no matter what promises had been made him, there would have been no danger in refusing him this office. If it be said that he deserved gratitude for his services, we have to inquire whether any king would put a general in command of his forces out of gratitude, when he knew that the soldiers would not follow him, and that he would be defeated and the kingdom probably lost. If it be the part of wisdom to lead one's troops into an action which can be avoided, knowing that by doing so the army will be utterly routed and the whole people dispirited, then it was wise to make this nomination. But if it be an act of folly to destroy one's own troops in a contest in which victory, even if won, would be wholly unprofitable, while defeat would be fatal, then this nomination is to be condemned.

In view of the principle that the first rule of the boss is the preservation of his own power, nothing was to be gained by the election of this judge. The revenue of the boss would not have been increased by one penny, nor his forces by a single follower, and although it is desirable to have friendly judges in this court, yet it would have been easy to obtain some one of sufficient pliability and popularity as well. There was therefore nothing to gain and everything to lose by making this nomination. The motive that influenced the boss to consent to it was obviously not his own interest, and it follows that he was led to do so to further the interests of another. The only possibility upon which such conduct could be justified is that this other was in position to deprive the boss of some great good, or to do him some great injury.

When we examine the circumstances, however, we see that this contingency did not exist, for it was the Senator, Hill, who was formerly Governor of the state, that caused this nomination to be made, and that must have led the boss to consent to it. It is not difficult to see that he was greatly interested in this matter, for if he succeeded in having

this judge elected he would then have appeared the most powerful politician of the country, and no one would have contested with him the next nomination to the Presidency by the Democrats. On the other hand, if he was deterred from nominating him, after all he had said about it, by the clamor of his opponents, then every one would have declared it was because of weakness; and when he desired to be nominated by the Democrats he would have been laughed at by the politicians as one who, as they say, could not carry his own state. However desperate the outlook, therefore, Senator Hill was in a position where it was more dangerous for him to retreat than to stand still, and his only hope lay in attacking with the utmost boldness. As every one knows, he was utterly ruined; for if the candidate who represented him was so completely overwhelmed, there is every reason to suppose that Senator Hill would himself fare even worse.

The conduct of the boss, therefore, would not have been altogether without justification if he had had reason to suppose that this judge could be elected, and that Senator Hill would make such appointments as were satis-

factory when he became President, and that the possibility of this future benefit was sufficient to outweigh the danger of present injury to his own power. But it cannot be maintained that any such reasons existed. There was ample experience to show that, even with a candidate that was unobjectionable, the alternation of popular whim or prejudice, especially in view of the great distress then prevailing among the poor, would bring about a defeat for the Democrats; and there was most abundant evidence that the reputation of the candidate would turn great numbers against him that would otherwise have voted with that party. It is true that much aid from the Republican politicians was counted on, and it does not seem that they failed to try to carry out the bargain; but the error arose from disregarding the simplicity of the issue. For when there are many candidates to be voted for, or when there are important questions to be decided in the national politics, the politicians can generally arrange many exchanges of votes; but in this election the choice of a judge of the highest court of the state was in every one's mind, and even the common people revolted at the

thought of choosing a lawbreaker to fill such a place.

Nor was it very probable that Senator Hill could have been chosen President even if he had succeeded in being nominated. For there is nothing that he has done that has pleased the people, but only the politicians; and even if he could have succeeded in obtaining the vote of the state of New York, it is by no means certain that he could have obtained a sufficient number of votes from the other states. The whole matter is wrapped in uncertainty, which is enough in itself to cause the boss to have nothing to do with it; moreover it is not certain that if Senator Hill were chosen President he would be altogether governed by the boss in making his appointments in the city of New York, for he would naturally become very arrogant and would not endure to be dictated to, being President of the whole people, by the ruler of one city. Even if this were not so, yet the whole possible gain was altogether insufficient to make it prudent for the boss to stake his own dominion upon such uncertain chances. Doubtless it is desirable to control the national offices in New York, but it is much more im-

portant to hold securely the regular revenues of the boss; and it is a capital mistake for him to risk the loss of everything merely for a chance of gain which is after all not indispensable.

If we inquire how this mistake came to be committed, we shall find that it was really the consequence of a previous error. For how came Senator Hill to occupy a position where he could involve the boss in his fortunes, and induce him to imperil his own dominion in aid of the ambitious schemes of another? This could only be through the error of the boss in allowing the power of Hill to grow too great. He should have long ago discerned the ambition of the man, and have made use of him only for a time, and then have destroyed him. He does not require allies that have plans for making themselves supreme; for it is inevitable that such allies should try to make use of his power to aid them in their ambitious schemes, while what he desires is assistance in his own legislation. It is better, therefore, to make use of the politicians of the state up to a certain point, and so long as they are not too ambitious; but when they begin to put their own ends

above those of the boss it is time for him to seek out allies that will be equally useful and less dangerous.

It is not easy to decide whether it was politic or not for the boss to make Hill Governor and Harrison President by arrangement with the Republican politicians. For in this way, it is true, the boss secured favorable legislation ; but he made Hill too powerful, and he certainly gave the national offices in the city of New York to the Republicans. True, President Cleveland had not made such appointments as the boss desired, but they were not altogether unsatisfactory, and if the boss had supported him he might have been even more complaisant. There was very little to be gained by the boss, therefore, through engaging in this commerce for the sake of Hill, and the increased power of the latter was a loss and not a gain ; so that it must be looked upon as a mistake ever to have allowed him to become Governor, or at least at that time.

Another mistake of a similar kind has been made in taking too prominent a part in nominating candidates for the Presidency. I must repeat the caution that a boss is a secret ruler, and that it is unwise to draw public attention

to himself. Hence he should not send a delegation to the convention of his party to demand that this man shall be nominated and that one not, as has several times been done of late. For in no instance did the late Boss of New York succeed in having the candidate he favored nominated, or the one he opposed defeated; although, as we have just seen, he prevented the election of one after he had been nominated. He thus failed altogether in securing the offices, which was the only interest he had in the matter; he made the President hostile to him by his conduct; and the affair was so notorious that he acquired a reputation for treachery to his party that he could never be rid of. The result of all these mistakes has been to weaken the organization greatly, by making it odious not only in the city of New York, but also in the whole country. For it must never be forgotten by a boss that his rule really depends upon his keeping the people from thinking of it. He and his organization are never beloved, and can endure only so long as the people are not stirred up to active sedition. If a boss acts upon the principle that he can defy the people, and attempts to rule them

openly and to display his power in a despotic manner, they will quickly rise against him and overthrow him, and even cast him into gaol, as they did Boss Tweed. Hence, as the organization of the boss necessarily comprehends many thieves and ruffians and miscreants of every kind, he should never allow it to parade or appear at all in public, lest the people, being suddenly made aware of the real character of those who rule over them, be moved by shame and disgust to revolt.

CHAPTER XXIX.

OF SOME FURTHER CONSEQUENCES OF THESE MISTAKES.

LET no one suppose that a defeat suffered by a boss in external affairs has no effect upon his power at home. If any one entertains such an opinion he has only to consider the disastrous consequences which have resulted from the folly of the Boss of New York in allowing himself to be made the tool of Senator Hill in the manner just set forth. For one of these consequences was that the boss lost control of the legislature, and because of this he was compelled to give up a great share of the revenue derived from the corporations to the Republican politicians, or else forego it altogether. He was also obliged to surrender the control of the police of New York by sharing it with the boss of the Republicans. Besides this he lost prestige

among his followers, and encouraged those whom he had allowed to grow too great to defy him openly and to combine to take the power away from him.

But what was worse than this, his defeat wonderfully cheered the Reformers, and stirred them up to make the most virulent attacks upon the organization. The nature of these attacks shows the truth of the maxims that I have laid down in this treatise. Where these maxims have been observed the organization has repelled all assaults, if any have been made; but where they have been violated the attack has succeeded. Thus the laws concerning voting at elections are just laws, in the sense that I have before explained; but the boss allowed his followers to violate them openly. Consequently when the organization was attacked because of this, it was able to offer no defense. The boss, therefore, by violating the maxim as to just laws, failed to accomplish that at which he aimed, demoralized his own forces, and caused the name of his organization to stink in the nostrils of the people.

Moreover his defeat enabled the Reformers to bring about an investigation of his govern-

ment. Ordinarily these investigations do a boss no harm, for they are conducted by the Republican politicians, who are his secret allies, and if a boss has wisely distributed his favors among them he is secure from injury. And in the present case the Republican politicians were indeed very reluctant to have an investigation; but they were not able to withstand the taunts of the Reformers. Even then, had the maxims here laid down been observed, the investigation would either not have taken place or would have had no injurious results. For if there had been a Republican politician among the Commissioners of Police he would have been held responsible for the corruption of that body, and his party with him; whereas, by yielding to the greed of his followers in demanding all these offices, the boss had assumed the entire responsibility. In consequence of these errors a great part of the system whereby the revenue of the boss is collected has been made public, to the incomputable injury of his power.

This investigation showed the wisdom of these maxims in another way. For I pointed out that it was unwise for a boss to allow his followers to levy any assessments for them-

selves, lest the burden to the citizens become intolerable. But this is exactly what the investigation disclosed; for the keepers of bawdy-houses had faithfully paid their regular assessments without any complaint, but when they found that in spite of this they were persecuted and that additional contributions were exacted from them, they were driven to despair. Had they been treated with justice by the boss and been secured the immunity for which they had paid, they would never have been brought to testify against him; for they would have feared that he might ruin them. But being already ruined by his oppression, and having nothing to hope for, they determined to take such revenge as was in their power by disclosing the methods by which the boss and his followers carried on the government of the city.

On the other hand, the observation of the principles which I laid down concerning the revenue to be derived from corporations was proved to be extremely advantageous to the boss in this investigation. For many of the managers of these corporations are Republicans and some of them are Republican politicians, and they were entirely unwilling that

their dealings with the boss should be made public. It is uncertain whether they stood in dread of the law or whether they were well satisfied with their treatment by the boss; nor is this point material, since it was at all events arranged that he should withdraw for a season to a foreign country. His release by the investigators is thus a sufficient proof that the collection of revenue from corporations had been managed with skill. By protecting them against the blackmailing schemes of his followers he has rendered them a service which it is worth their while to pay for; and by allowing the Republican leaders to receive some of this revenue he has made sure that they will take pains to keep it secret. Thus a wise liberality is productive of more revenue in the end than a selfish greed. "There is that scattereth, and yet increaseth; and there is that withholdeth more than is meet, but it tendeth to poverty."

CHAPTER XXX.

OF WHAT DESERVES PRAISE OR BLAME IN THE CONDUCT OF BOSSES.

IT now remains to show in what manner a boss should behave to his subjects and followers. Now I, like Machiavelli, write only for those who possess sound judgment, and I think it better to treat this subject as it really is, rather than to amuse the imagination with visionary models of republics and governments which have never existed. I am aware that Machiavelli has been much blamed because he counsels princes to be wicked. But he explicitly says that the manner in which men live is so different from that in which they ought to live, that he who deviates from the common course, and endeavors to act as duty dictates, necessarily insures his own destruction. Thus, he says, a good man, if he wishes to be virtuous in all respects, must

be undone in a contest with so many who are wicked. Accordingly, when he inquires if a prince ought to be faithful to his engagements, he shows that all great princes have resorted to deceit, and that it is impossible for any one to succeed otherwise.

To place this matter in the clearest light, let those who contend that bosses or princes ought to exercise all the virtues answer this question: How should a general behave in the face of the enemy? Is he bound to explain to his adversary the movements that he is about to make, the number and position of his troops, and the strength of his defenses; or shall he mislead him by all manner of deceit? But whatever is true of a general is still more true of a boss. He is surrounded with deadly enemies, who are continually on the watch to overthrow him; and of those who pretend to be his friends the most are ever ready to turn traitors. It would doubtless be happy, as Machiavelli says, for a prince to unite in himself every species of good quality, and the same is true of a boss; but our nature and the circumstances in which we are placed do not allow such perfection to exist. Machiavelli did not write his treatise

for the purpose of encouraging men to be princes; nor do I recommend any one to try to make himself a boss. But there are certain principles that must be followed by princes and bosses if they are to maintain themselves, and it is desirable that these should be clearly understood; by bosses for their own safety, and by reformers in order that they may know how to direct their attacks. As a writer upon the art of war is not condemned because he advises how the most horrible carnage and destruction may be produced, so ought neither Aristotle nor Machiavelli, nor those who imitate them, to be blamed for explaining the methods followed by politicians.

Let a boss, then, avoid both the defects and the virtues that may occasion his ruin, but let him not shrink from encountering some blame on account of vices which are important to the support of his power. Yet, as Machiavelli admits, it is very desirable to appear to have good qualities, even if one does not really possess them; and Aristotle expresses the same opinion. A boss, like a prince, cannot exercise all the virtues, because self-preservation will often compel him to violate the laws of charity, religion, and justice;

but he should endeavor to gain a reputation among the people for kindness, piety, justice, and fidelity to his engagements, and never utter anything in public which does not breathe of these qualities. He should persevere in the path of rectitude so long as he feels no inconvenience in so doing, and only deviate from it when prudence dictates such a course. He should keep his word when he can do it without injury to himself, and be careful not to break faith with those whom he will have to call upon at another time. It is idle for a boss to think of gaining the affection of the citizens; yet if he cannot gain their love, he may at least avoid their hatred. But among his own followers he should be esteemed merciless; for only by dread of severe punishment can they be kept in discipline. As Machiavelli says, friends acquired by means of money alone, and whose attachment does not spring from a regard for personal merit, are seldom proof against reverse of fortune, but abandon their benefactor when he most requires their services. Friendship of this kind, being a mere moral tie, a species of duty resulting from a benefit, cannot endure against the calculations of interest; whereas

fear carries with it the dread of punishment, which never loses its influence.

Concerning the breaking of faith, it should be added that such promises as a boss may find it inconvenient to fulfil he should never make either in writing or in the presence of witnesses. This rule he can the more easily observe because of the secrecy of his government; and, if he follow it, those who accuse him of bad faith will be unable to establish the truth of their complaints, and will be thought to be aggrieved by some private disappointment. A boss ought also to take care that he breaks faith only with those who are not strong enough to injure him, or who cannot serve him in the future. Accordingly he should ruin a man at the time when he breaks faith with him, in order to prevent him from being mischievous; and if the circumstances do not permit of this, then it will generally be better to keep faith with him, unless the cost be too great. This is especially true in the case of the Republican leaders. A boss needs their aid continually, and they are so situated that he cannot ruin them; therefore he should make them trust him, or they will not keep faith with him in their turn.

But toward his own followers a boss need not hesitate to practise deceit. If he follow the maxims that I have advanced, none of these henchmen should be sufficiently powerful to be dangerous to him, and he ought to be able to ruin any of them whenever he chooses. He may therefore make them such promises as are necessary to obtain willing service; but if he find it not expedient to keep these promises, let him not commit the mistake of retaining among his followers those whom he has disappointed. This would be like the error of Antoninus, which Machiavelli mentions, in keeping in his body-guard a centurion whose brother he had put to an ignominious death, and whom he continually threatened; an imprudence which cost him his life. Matters of severity should be finished at one blow, that when the impulse to revenge is most powerful the difficulty may be the greatest.

CHAPTER XXXI.

OF CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED.

THAT a boss should be feared by his followers I have already maintained; but the matter deserves further explanation. A boss cannot make use of the cruelties practised by tyrants and princes of old, who had it in their power to kill those obnoxious to them and to confiscate their property. Nevertheless he can frequently make it difficult for one whom he is determined to injure to succeed in earning a living; and this is peculiarly true of politicians, since if they are deprived of office they are generally unable to do anything for their own support. It is evident, therefore, that it is possible for a boss to be severe, as well as a prince or a tyrant, although in a somewhat different way. And it still re-

mains true that by showing severity at the proper time there is frequently a saving of suffering. By making a few examples at the beginning a boss really shows more humanity in the end, than if by too great indulgence he permits disorders to arise which terminate in rebellion. Such disorders disturb the whole organization, while punishments inflicted by a boss affect only a few individuals.

The fact that Machiavelli especially recommends this policy to a new prince is evidence that it is the proper policy for a boss. He quotes with approbation what Virgil wrote of Dido, who excused her severity by the necessity under which she lay of defending a throne which she did not inherit from her ancestors :

*Res dura et regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moliri.*

Men are still, as they were formerly, ungrateful, timid, fickle, dissembling, and selfish ; so long as you can serve them they are entirely devoted to you, but in the day of need they turn their back upon you. He that rules such creatures will find a reputation for cruelty useful to him by keeping them in obedience ; and so it was in the case of

Hannibal, who led a large army composed of all kinds of people into a foreign country, and yet had never occasion, either in prosperity or adversity, to punish the least disorder or the slightest lack of discipline.

Since the authority of a boss rests upon no foundation of law, or hereditary dignity, or affection, but simply upon the desire of gain among his followers, it is necessary to its permanency that they should be made to tremble at the very thought of treachery to him. This can only be brought about by his punishing, with all the severity in his power, whomsoever he sees to be ambitious of supplanting him, or inclined to the company of plotters. This matter will not be clearly understood without carefully discriminating between the ways laid down by Aristotle for preserving a tyranny, which appear to be altogether opposite to one another. But if we look at them narrowly we see that one of these ways is to be followed by the tyrant or the boss in dealing with the citizens — and of this I shall presently speak — but the other is to be taken in holding the nobles or the politicians in subjection. As to them it is undoubtedly true that the tyrant or the boss

ought to keep down those who rise too high, to guard against everything which is wont to give rise to high spirits or mutual confidence, to endeavor to know what every one chooses to do or say, and for this purpose to employ spies, and, in short, to spread everywhere suspicion and distrust. Aristotle sums up the whole matter in the statement that there should be three objects kept constantly in view. One is, that the subjects should be of abject dispositions, for such men never conspire against any one. The second is, that they shall have no confidence in one another, for while this is so the ruler is safe from attack. And the third object is, that the subjects shall be without the means of doing anything, for no one undertakes what it is plainly impossible for him to perform. What Aristotle and Machiavelli unite in recommending need not be enforced by me; and he is a vain and presumptuous boss that thinks he can safely disregard their cautions.

I will not repeat what these authors have to say of the dangers of being hated and despised, and of yielding to the pleasures of sense, and of listening to flatterers; not because they are not important, but because it

is better that every boss should read these warnings for himself, and behold the examples which history has to offer him. But in leaving the subject of punishment it should be said that a boss may with great advantage, upon many occasions, allow the magistrates to apply the law in the case of such followers as he intends to destroy. For they will generally have done things for which the law provides punishment, and by allowing it to be put in execution a boss may not only avoid personal encounters and resentments, but may also flatter the people by leading them to believe that he does not hinder the administration of justice but sustains it; and this, too, is recommended by Aristotle. But at the same time a boss should liberally reward those who prove themselves wholly faithful, so that all may see that but one way exists wherein they may fare securely and prosperously. In this manner a boss may avoid the hatred, and even win the servile attachment, if not the affection, of most of his followers.

CHAPTER XXXII.

OF THE MEANS WHEREBY RULERS FIRMLY ESTABLISH THEIR POWER.

AFTER considering the causes which destroy a monarchy or kingdom, Aristotle points out that as one of these causes lies in bringing the government nearer to a tyranny, so the safety of a tyranny consists in making the government more nearly like that of a king. He lays it down, therefore, that the tyrant, after having made sure of the power, should partly act and partly affect to seem like a king. He should appear to pay attention to what belongs to the public, and not indulge in such lavish expenditure as will offend the people, who will be apt to think that his luxury is paid for out of their earnings. Aristotle also recommends, as I have before shown, that a tyrant should keep an exact account both of what is received and of what is disbursed, and should endeavor to appear to col-

lect taxes and to require public services only for the purposes of the state and not for his own uses. He ought also to improve and adorn the city, and observe many other precepts tending to keep his subjects quiet and contented. The whole matter is summed up by Aristotle when he says that the rule of conduct for a tyrant is to affect the character of a guardian and king; to appear not the plunderer but the protector of his people; to avoid ostentatious superiority in his manner of living; and to so order his conduct that he may appear virtuous, or at least half good, and not wholly wicked, but only in part.

Machiavelli in his turn discourses of liberality and parsimony, and says that it is for the interest of a prince to be accounted liberal, but dangerous for him so to exercise his liberality as to be thereby neither feared nor respected. He explains this by saying that if a prince be only liberal for his own gratification he will please but few and will be called selfish. A prince who wishes to gain the reputation of being liberal should be regardless of expense; but then, to support this reputation, he will often be reduced to the necessity of levying taxes upon his subjects,

and of resorting to every species of fiscal expedient, which cannot fail to make him odious. Besides exhausting the public treasury by his prodigality he will destroy his credit, and will run the risk of losing his power on the first reverse of fortune; his liberality, as always happens, having insured him more enemies than friends. And, which is worse, he cannot retrace his steps and replenish his finances without being charged with avarice.

A prince, therefore, who cannot be liberal without endangering his power should not trouble himself much about the imputation of being covetous; for he will be esteemed liberal in time, when his people see that by economy he has improved his revenue so as to be able to undertake useful enterprises without imposing new taxes. Then the many from whom he takes nothing will deem him sufficiently liberal, and the few only whose greed he has failed to satisfy will accuse him of avarice. Machiavelli illustrates this by the example of Julius II, who attained the pontifical chair by means of his bounty, but judged rightly in supposing that in order to succeed in his wars he must practise parsimony at the sacrifice of all reputation for liberality.

He also refers to Cæsar, who, it is alleged, could never have attained the empire but by his liberality, and comments upon this claim in these words: " You are either in possession of dominion already, or you are not. In the former case liberality would be prejudicial; in the latter case the reputation of it is serviceable and necessary." Cæsar endeavored to appear liberal while he aspired to the empire of Rome. But if he had lived longer he would have lost that reputation for liberality which had paved him the way to empire, or he would have lost himself in the attempt to preserve it. There have been princes, like Cyrus, Alexander, and Cæsar himself, distinguished for their success and also for their liberality; their prodigality, however, was not at the expense of the public purse, but was supported out of the spoils of war. Machiavelli, however, cordially approves great enterprises as tending to make a prince esteemed, and recommends him to honor talents, to protect the arts, to have provision made for the entertainment of the people with festivals and shows, and to do everything in his power to attach his subjects to his rule by making their lives as easy and pleasant for them as

possible. In their advice to the tyrant and to the prince it thus appears that Aristotle and Machiavelli are altogether at one, and it only remains for me to show the application of their wisdom to the particular circumstances of a boss of New York.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

EXHORTATION TO THE BOSS OF NEW YORK TO DELIVER THE CITY FROM MISGOV- ERNMENT.

As I began by pointing out that he who would enjoy permanent power as a boss must be contented to live without ostentation, so I will conclude this treatise with the same reflection. For if it be true, as Aristotle says, that a tyrant ought to pay attention to what belongs to the city, and not indulge in lavish expense, lest he offend the people, it is also true of a boss. If he who has no open source of revenue spends great sums in buying race-horses and stock-farms, and maintains race-courses himself, besides building a palace and maintaining a gorgeous equipage, he cannot fail to arouse envy and hatred. Moreover, by participating in the gains made by encouraging gambling at the race-tracks, he

will be tempted to enforce the law against gambling elsewhere; in which way he will incur the enmity of the gamblers, as is said to have happened in the case of those who keep what are called pool-rooms. Their plight may not excite the sympathy of the people, but they are most trustworthy supporters of the organization, and they are likely to become disaffected when they see their own gains reduced in order to swell those of the boss. It is true, then, as Aristotle says, that many will think that these luxuries of the boss are paid for out of their hard labor.

What Machiavelli says of liberality is also true. If the boss allow the city to be plundered by his followers, and blackmail to be levied on every hand, he will find it impossible to obtain the necessary means for great schemes of improvement. What vast revenues might now be flowing not only into the treasury of the organization but also into the coffers of the boss, out of the construction of a roadway underneath the city, had not the organization become so odious through its blackmail that every citizen cries out whenever it proposes any new undertaking! It is

not even possible to build a great palace for the public offices, because the rapacity of some of the followers of the boss has become ungovernable. What is this but to be liberal in such a way as to be neither feared nor respected? Has it secured any friends to the boss? Or rather has it not made him more enemies and ingrates than friends?

It is true that in order to lay hold of the power it may be necessary to be liberal, as Cæsar was; although he was able to secure the means for this by the sale of the captives that he took in war. But when once power has been attained, the boss should see to it that his liberality never takes the form of allowing his followers to plunder at their will. As Aristotle says, he need never fear the lack of money so long as he is ruler, but let him obtain and expend it in the manner that I have shown, and not with an ill-advised liberality that only makes him odious to the citizens and weak in the eyes of those whose excesses he winks at. And as to his own expenditure, let it be as secret as possible, in order that he may not suffer the fate of the tyrants described by Aristotle, who perished because, from the vain wish to be envied,

they invited many to witness their extravagance and debauchery.

In order to win esteem for himself, or at least such a degree of favor as to make him safe against revolt, the boss should therefore follow Aristotle's advice and endeavor to appear rather the guardian than the plunderer of the city, and to gratify the pride and promote the comfort of the inhabitants. For the people of this city care principally for two things: to be comfortable themselves, and to make a display before one another. And of the two, perhaps they would for the most part rather seem to others to be happy and luxurious than really to be so; for they are willing to live in very confined abodes provided they can dress so as to be thought rich when they go abroad. Moreover men are so constituted that every individual regards himself as somehow of greater merit and importance when he is a citizen of a great community than when he is an inhabitant of a village; and this is true whether he deserves any distinction or not. Even St. Paul took pride in being of no mean city; and he who dwells in a city with two millions of other men, although he may be himself ignorant

and vicious, yet feels a contempt for even wise and virtuous men who dwell in smaller communities.

This form of pride is especially stimulated by whatever makes a city beautiful, convenient, and magnificent. All public works that tend to do this are a support to a boss, and the more magnificent they are the greater the esteem in which he stands. Thus even Boss Tweed is spoken of with favor by many because of the great avenues laid out under his rule; and the same is true of Boss Shepherd of the city of Washington. Let not a boss fear the expense of such works; for if they render the city more attractive the citizens will make little complaint of the cost, and, besides, rich men will be more drawn to dwell here from all parts of the country, thereby lightening the burden. Nothing has been more productive of revenue to the politicians than the great bridge over the East River; but so great is the pride of the people in this structure that no one ever inquires into the cost of maintaining it. Even if these works cannot be made directly productive of revenue to a boss, because of the interference of the Reformers, yet as they tend to draw

wealth to the city they are sure to increase his revenue indirectly.

Upon this principle nothing is more foolish than for a boss to permit laws to be passed, or to be enforced, that expose the wealthy to vexation and annoyance. All attempts to pry into the sources of the income of citizens or its amount, for the purposes of taxation, are of this nature, and it is because of their freedom from vexation of this kind hitherto that so many wealthy persons have come to this city to reside. But in recent years we have seen such laws enacted as drive the richest corporations to seek their charters without the state. A boss that permits and encourages such an imbecile policy as this is not likely to hold his place very long. He not only dries up the sources of his revenue, but by the annoyance he occasions the managers of the corporations he turns them into most dangerous enemies. Now, also, there are incessant attempts made to compel people that own property that has already paid taxes to pay again upon their evidences of property, so that many of them spend their time in foreign countries or in other places where they are not harassed in this way. Such a

policy as this will not be pursued by any enlightened boss, but he will endeavor rather to secure for the wealthy, so long as they do not oppose him, all manner of protection and relief from annoyance.

Indeed it is undoubtedly true that the greatest support of the government of the boss at present lies in the protection to life and property that it furnishes. Men delight to walk abroad without fear of violence, and to sleep in their houses without dread of robbery ; and they are not easily moved to rebel against a government which secures them these blessings. But if they find that they are in danger of robbery under the guise of taxation and other forms of law, and are plundered rather than protected by the police, they will quickly cease to be contented with their rulers. Let the boss, therefore, study by every means in his power to allay apprehensions of this kind ; thinking, like the husbandman who sows seed, that what he seems to lose now he will gather with increase hereafter.

In the matter of public works and improvements, also, a boss should remember that his subjects greatly consider their own comfort

and are enraged and disaffected when they cannot go forth without annoyance. The policy of covering the streets with smooth pavements is undoubtedly to be commended, for it has not only brought in revenue, but has also won much support to the boss ; but this advantage is in danger of being lost if the streets are not kept clean. I am aware that a boss encounters here a great difficulty, owing to his being obliged to rule through the Irish race. For these people, being uncivilized in their own country, and accustomed to live in cabins which they share with fowls and swine, become indifferent to ordure ; it being a saying among them, to justify their mode of life, that as the pig pays the rent he deserves to share the cot. Accordingly when they come to this city they consider it a waste of time to clean the streets, and probably the most of them do not know whether they are clean or filthy. Hence it is not easy to get them to attend to this matter, even if they are paid to do so. But there is nothing in the shape of misgovernment that so openly appears as this. For it cannot be concealed, and it is as it were forced upon the senses of all, both residents and strangers. A wise

boss will therefore permit none of his followers to trifle in this business, but will see to it that the work is done; rightly considering nothing beneath his attention that directly affects the disposition of his subjects. I do not hesitate to say that this single matter is of vital importance to the rule of the boss, for if he had taken care that the streets were always free from filth and dust, and were kept smoothly paved and clear of obstructions, the Reformers would now try to overthrow him in vain, no matter how great sums he had expended; whereas by allowing the streets to be filthy and unsafe he disgusted the citizens and made them ready to listen to his enemies.

Let the boss, then, as Aristotle recommends, play the part of a real king, securing to himself the power in the manner that I have explained, but using it to make the city not only safe, comfortable, and healthy, but also convenient, stately, and splendid. Let him not fear to be extravagant in spending great sums upon docks and parks and public buildings, provided they are beautiful and magnificent. For such things, as plainly appeared at the great Fair at the city of

